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SUMMARY 
 
Special Activity Generators have been a policy popular with governments across 
the country seeking to revitalize lethargic downtowns. Sports facilities, a widespread 
form of Special Activity Generators, have been shown to be incapable of generating 
regional economic benefits, but are able to generate urban redevelopment. While sports 
facilities are well studied by academics, minor league stadiums have not been the focus 
of significant research despite the larger number of such projects.  
My dissertation uses a sequential explanatory mixed methodology to answer 
whether minor league baseball stadiums are successful as Special Activity Generators. I 
first use a quantitative analysis of sixteen stadiums built around the year 2000 which 
finds a significant effect of the stadium on nearby neighborhoods in comparison to the 
rest of the city. However, that growth is created by concentrating redevelopment, not 
creating unique activity. Two case studies clarify that the stadiums were critical to the 
observed redevelopment efforts, but also that there is a need for thorough planning and 
collocated amenities prior to construction in order to maximize the results from the public 
investment. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Major league sports facilities have been a central focus of urban scholars for the 
past three decades but the arenas and stadiums of the minor leagues have received far less 
attention. The most significant research on the topic was Arthur Johnson’s (1995) Minor 
League Baseball and Local Economic Development, which coincided with the growth in 
minor league stadium construction in the early 1990s but was unable to observe its long-
term effects. Since its publication in 1995, eighty-three1 minor league baseball stadiums 
have been built in the United States at ever escalating costs, with several more projected 
to open in the next few years.  
My dissertation extends the understanding of sports stadiums and urban 
redevelopment into the nebulous frontiers of minor league baseball, where new leagues 
arise regularly and teams fold and relocate yearly. I situate the relationship between 
minor league baseball and their host cities within Robertson’s (1995) framework for 
Special Activity Generators (SAGs). SAGs are meant to add vitality to a blighted area 
and encourage increased activity and ancillary construction, making them a popular 
redevelopment tool; Robertson outlines three principle purposes for SAGS, which I proxy 
for in order to evaluate whether minor league baseball stadiums succeed in their long-
term goal of urban revitalization.   
I use a sequential explanatory mixed methodology to answer whether minor 
league baseball stadiums are successful as Special Activity Generators. I first address the 
 
1 Through 2016, and that is only considering stadiums built for teams playing in Low-A or higher levels of 
competition; Appendix A contains a discussion of the different levels of minor league competition. 
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question quantitatively with a large sample to understand whether a generalized pattern of 
stadium effects can be detected.  Specifically, I use census data at the tract level to 
analyze how the areas where stadiums are located differ from the rest of their city in 
order to assess whether they are in fact being placed in areas of blight. In addition, I 
evaluate the effects of minor league baseball stadiums one decade later on adjacent 
communities on median home prices, median incomes, new housing construction, 
population, and residential vacancy rates.  
With the generalized effects of stadiums on urban redevelopment established, I 
conduct case studies of two cities. In particular, the case studies allow me to validate 
findings from the quantitative analysis, and to reanalyze the question using more 
localized data, including from the Economic Census. For two cities I again answer where 
stadiums locate along with their effects one decade later on surrounding census tracts. In 
addition, I assess how significant a role the stadium played in the results derived in the 
quantitative analysis. 
In this chapter, I discuss the history of government invo0lvement in city 
development and the theoretical framework used in the analysis. In addition, I introduce 
minor league baseball and the stadiums they play in, with a particular focus on 
differentiating minor and major league sport. 
1.1 Urban Context. 
In the United States, inner cities declined sharply in the mid-20th century as the 
twin forces of deindustrialization and suburbanization took hold. Deindustrialization 
removed cities’ central role as the locus of production and shipping, as well as reduced 
the employment opportunities for their residents (Koritz, 1991). Suburbanization 
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occurred throughout the century prior, but accelerated during the 1960s, partially as a 
result of transportation technologies, but also in reaction to the civil rights movement, 
school desegregation, and changes in racial composition after the Great Migration 
(Mieszkowski & Mills, 1993; Mills & Price, 1984). Bereft of middle class tax payers, 
cities declined further during the 1970’s, as violent crime increased, public schools 
deteriorated, and housing prices plunged (Cutler, Glaeser, & Vigdor, 1997). 
After a period of decline set it, governments in central cities began a series of 
policies in the 1960s to encourage the middle-class to return. Urban revitalization 
programs cleared whole sections of cities to remove blight in an attempt to eliminate 
perceived decay (Vale, 2013). Public transportation, waterfront promenades, tourist 
districts, and shopping malls have all been supported by government as reactions to 
deteriorating downtowns, though few of these projects have strengthened cities 
economies (Glaeser, 2011; Robertson, 1995). 
While governments have financed numerous types of building projects, few have 
attracted the public attention of sports stadiums. Prior to the 1950’s, stadiums were 
primarily financed privately but as professional teams realized that threats of relocation 
could secure new stadiums, governments found themselves involved in ever more costly 
projects. Initially, public contributions to stadiums were primarily defended by supporters 
on the basis of projected growth in regional income and jobs, but academics have 
consistently and thoroughly demonstrated those claims to be false (Coates & Humphreys, 
2008). Though economic development arguments have not been completely absent in 
recent public debates, since the 1990s urban redevelopment surrounding stadiums has 
become a prominent justification for public financing going to the projects. Regardless of 
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the motive, between 1950 and 2005, governments spent over $7 billion on sports 
facilities collectively for teams in the MLB, NFL, NBA, and NHL (Long, 2005). 
In the first half of the 20th century, stadiums were often built on the outskirts of 
cities because owners were concerned with finding cheap land to develop when relying 
on their own private funds (T. Chapin, 1999).2 As governments came to finance portions 
of stadiums, public officials began insisting in many cases that they be located not at the 
urban fringe but inside the city3, typically within struggling downtowns. Locating a sports 
facility in a city’s downtown provides an impetus for additional development in the area, 
which officials argue will stimulate the districts growth. Attracted by the new anchor 
tenant and the implicit commitment of the government to the neighborhood, stadiums and 
arenas have helped mobilize the investment of private capital into an area (Chapin, 2004). 
These acts of collateral development, be they retail, restaurants, or residential, help 
transform downtowns into lively neighborhoods.  
Downtowns carried a heavily negative connotation into the 1980s and 1990s, but 
sporting events attract individuals to the area that otherwise would not visit and helped to 
alleviate concerns about safety (Johnson, Glover, & Stewart, 2014). In addition, sports 
facilities add variety to the hours that downtowns are utilized, shifting the area from a 9-5 
schedule towards use at all hours (Johnson, 1991). The project creates a major public 
center of activity, hosting other events, such as concerts and local amateur sports, 
benefitting and attracting residents uninterested in professional sports. 
Beyond urban redevelopment, cities and governments have other reasons for their 
 
2 Antique stadiums such as Wrigley and Fenway, within their cities in modern time, were built on the fringe 
of cities and development has since surrounded them (Gershman, 1995). 
3 If not located within the city, stadiums are typically located in suburban areas within new build sites with 
hotels, restaurants, and retail. These sites have a distinct logic from downtown stadiums. 
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willingness to help build sports stadiums. For the government officials involved it gives 
the appearance of success, and with the struggling economies of cities during the second 
half of the 20th century, demonstrating positive action was necessary (Blakely & Leigh, 
2013; Johnson, 1995). In the public’s mind cities and officials that are able to manage the 
development of a stadium appear to be more capable than those that fail to do so 
(Euchner, 1994). Within each league, there are a limited number of teams available and 
every city desires their own franchise in order to boost civic pride and set the city itself 
apart. Cities of all sizes have demonstrated a willingness to give public dollars to sports 
facilities, even those far too small to attract major league franchises. Luckily for them, 
there are a range of teams and leagues available to fit any city’s price range. 
1.2 What is Minor League Baseball? 
While major league sports have been the focus of most public and academic 
debates about the wisdom of building sports stadiums, minor league baseball has 
established itself as an alternative in cities lacking the finances or population to host a 
major league franchise. Minor league sports refers to teams and leagues outside of the 
“Big Four” North American sports, which are Major League Baseball (MLB), the 
National Football League (NFL), the National Basketball Association (NBA), and the 
National Hockey League (NHL).4 The term ‘minor league baseball’ encompasses 
organized professional baseball throughout the United States within the official hierarchy 
of Minor League Baseball (MiLB) as well as professional teams and leagues that operate 
independently. Throughout my dissertation, the term ‘minor league baseball’ will refer to 
all leagues collectively, while I will use ‘MiLB’ to refer specifically to those affiliated 
 
4 Major League Soccer (MLS) still trails the Big Four Sports in total and television revenue considerably. 
Its rapid growth has been impressive, but it has not transformed the Big Four into the Big Five yet. 
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with Major League Baseball. 
Teams in MiLB are owned independently, but are all affiliated with an 
organization in Major League Baseball that owns the contracts for players and makes 
decisions about where each player plays. MiLB are developmental leagues, which means 
that their primary purpose is to improve and mature players that are too inexperienced to 
play the sport at the highest level. Teams in MiLB compete in a range of leagues 
designated based on the level of competition, from Rookie League that is for the most 
recent draft picks, up to Triple-A, the highest and most professional quality league. I 
more fully explain the different leagues and levels of competition in Appendix A. 
Independent leagues play throughout the country and have quality comparable to 
MiLB, but have a high failure rate and generally feature players who were undrafted out 
of college, failed in MLB’s minor leagues, or are aging former stars. The leagues in 
MiLB largely started as independent entities or competitors to Major League Baseball but 
were eventually incorporated into its hierarchy and control.5 As of the 2015 seasons, 
there are four established independent leagues playing in the United States in addition to 
the twenty of MiLB. 
Minor league baseball is more family friendly than its counterparts at the major 
league level, in part because owners cannot rely on talented teams to draw fans to the 
ballpark since the quality of play is inferior and the players more transient. The owners of 
minor league teams focus on making games accessible to casual fans, pairing affordable 
 
5 In the 1920’s all minor league teams were independently owned and MLB teams would purchase the 
rights to players from the owner of the team they played for. Branch Rickey, then with the St. Louis 
Cardinals, began investing in minor league teams to circumvent negotiating over purchasing players. The 
‘farm system’ made the 1930’s Cardinals a powerhouse, and eventually other teams began adopting a 
similar tactic, and eventually the modern system developed where teams are affiliated with one parent club.  
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costs with promotions and events within the game (Bernthal & Graham, 2003; Cebula, 
Toma, & Carmichael, 2009). The fact that the players are paid considerably less than 
those in Major League Baseball,6 have small odds of ever playing at the games highest 
level, still ride buses to away games, and play far from the lights of big cities has created 
the illusion that they ‘play for the love of the game’. Numerous books have been written 
about life in the minors, as authors search for the soul of America in a minor league 
ballpark.7 
The stadiums used by minor league baseball teams are an order of magnitude less 
expensive than those in the sports highest levels. For instance, the five MLB stadiums 
opened since 2008 have a total average cost of $692 million, while the last five stadiums 
built at the highest level of the minor leagues averaged $59 million; stadiums for the 
lower levels of MiLB cost still less. 
Despite the humble facilities in comparison to major league franchises, the costs 
of minor league stadiums have increased steadily over time. Figure 1.1 displays the total 
spending on new stadiums that have been built since the late 1980s for MiLB teams at the 
Triple-A, Double-A, High-A, and Low-A levels.8 Each individual stadium’s costs is 
 
6 Minor Leaguers monthly pay (during the season) starts at a bit over $1000, and rarely goes above $2500. 
However, high drafts picks can received large bonuses ranging about $1 million, although most players 
receive far less. 
7 For example, at the beginning of Stolen Season, before setting out on a cross-country road trip, the author 
David Lamb (2014) admits he “had never even been to a minor league game, but [he] knew the marriage 
was perfect: America and the minor leagues, each a metaphor for the other.” (p. x). Other recent books in 
the genre include Class A: Baseball in the Middle of Everywhere by Lucas Mann (2013) and Where 
Nobody Knows Your Name by John Feinstein (2014). 
8 Data on stadium construction costs from The Sports Facilities Report published online by Marquette’s 
Law School. Marquette publishes The Sports Facilities Report annually with articles and features related to 
sports economics as well as information about teams, facilities, revenues, lease agreements, and more. The 
reports have been published since 2000 with information on the Big Four Major Leagues, but only in 2005 
did they add information and data about minor league baseball stadiums . The Sports Facilities Report only 
contains information for teams that play at or above Single-A leagues of MiLB, excluding teams playing in 
Short-Season A and Rookie Leagues of MiLB as well as independent leagues. Figures for the costs of 
stadium construction are uneven in the Sports Facilities Report, as only 76 are available of the 136 MiLB 
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indicated by a point in the scatterplot, but attention should focus on the trend lines 
showing the steady increase in prices even when adjusting for inflation. The lower levels 
of Minor League Baseball have increased the most rapidly and the costs of Double-A 
stadiums are beginning to approach those of the Triple-A.  
 
Figure 1.1 Stadium Spending by League 
 
The increase in spending on stadiums can also be characterized by looking 
directly at the cost of replacement stadiums when teams relocate or otherwise receive a 
new facility.9 Figure 1.2 displays the cost of the old and new stadium for the 11 Triple-A 
teams that have opened new ballparks since the year 2000. In only one case has a stadium 
 
teams included; however, the report is by far the most comprehensive source for MILB stadium financing 
information presently available. The available data was supplemented by manual web searches of local 
newspapers in each host city to ascertain an estimate of the total costs. 
9 Data for replacement stadium costs are as described in the previous footnote. For the stadiums that were 
replaced costs were generated by web searches of local newspapers for each city. 
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cost less than what it replaced.10 In addition, the average cost increased across the 
projects by $23.5 million, more than doubling the $21.8 million spent on average for the 
replaced stadiums.  
 
Figure 1.2 Change in Stadium Cost 
 
Despite lower costs relative to MLB facilities, minor league baseball stadiums are 
well suited for redevelopment based on their usage and architecture. Teams in affiliated 
baseball that play in full season leagues typically host 70 home games per season across 
the summer months. The large number of events relative to other sports and the length of 
seasons helps to introduce visitors to an area and create sustained vitality. In addition to 
those games, stadiums are often used for concerts and other events, though because 
 
10 It should be noted that the Colorado Springs Sky Sox, users of the only stadium that costs less than it 
replaced, may be relocating in the near future. Reports came out in 2016 that they would move to San 
Antonio, if San Antonio was able to build a new downtown minor league baseball stadium. As of 2017 the 
situation remains unsettled.  
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playing fields are generally uncovered, winter use is rarer.  
Minor league stadiums are also compact in their footprint, generally fitting within 
2-square city blocks. New minor league stadiums generally carry a seating capacity of 
10,000 or less, and while that means that the attendance will be much smaller than that of 
a major league team, it also means that less dedicated parking will need to be supplied. In 
some cases a city’s existing parking can handle the increased parking demand that the 
stadium requires, particularly on weekends and nights. The lack of parking lots helps to 
reduce the stadium’s footprint and allows for ancillary activity to locate closer (Kraus, 
2003).  
Minor league baseball’s hosts range in size from New York City (specifically 
Brooklyn and Stanton Island) to Burlington, Iowa, whereas Major League Baseball 
confines itself to the largest of American cities. The wide range of locations teams play in 
is displayed in Table 1. Along with parts of Canada, Mexico, the Dominican Republic, 
Venezuela, and Puerto Rico, one hundred and forty-five11 American Core Based 
Statistical Areas (CBSA) host at least one team in MiLB.  
 
Table 1.1. Range of CBSAs hosting Minor League Baseball 
Rank CBSA Population League 
Smallest Burlington, IA-IL 47,500 Single-A 
25th Perc. Norwich-New London, CT 274,000 Single-A 
Median Harrisburg-Carlisle, PA 552,000 Single-A 
75th Perc. Buffalo-Cheektowaga-Niagara Falls, NY 1,135,000 Triple-A 
Largest New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA 19,717,000 Single-A 
 
11 The nationwide character of minor league baseball contributed to baseball becoming known as the 
“national pastime” prior to MLB teams relocating to Southern and Western cities or the permeation of 
television 
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The strength of studying minor league baseball’s stadiums and the necessity of 
doing so are interrelated. The necessity derives from the large number of cities building 
such projects without explicit research analyzing what benefits they can expect; at 
present, the majority of academic research concentrates on major league sports, which as 
discussed, are much greater in their costs and footprints so the outcomes they produce 
may not be applicable to minor league stadiums.  
However, because a large number of cities have built minor league stadiums with 
the purpose of generating urban redevelopment, it provides an expansive sample with 
which to study such projects. In addition, the fact that facilities are smaller in scale and 
cost should make lessons from the redevelopment surrounding minor league sports 
facilities more on par with the types of public works American cities expect to be able to 
finance. The larger sample size of minor league stadiums and cities includes greater 
variety in demographics, geography, and financial power, allowing the results to apply 
beyond the confines of America’s largest cities. Thus, the results of studying minor 
league sports should be more generalizable than a sample of major league cities. 
1.3 Theoretical Framework: Stadiums as Special Activity Generators 
Minor league baseball stadiums are a form of Special Activity Generator (SAG) 
popular with small-to-medium cities. As theorized by Robertson (1995), Special Activity 
Generators, such as stadia, performing arts centers, museums, aquariums, and convention 
centers, serve as redevelopment tools by attracting visitors to the area and by catalyzing 
private investment. Sports stadiums for major league teams as a form of SAG have been 
studied often by researchers for their contribution to urban redevelopment, particularly 
with regard to their effect on housing prices (Ahfeldt and Maennig, 2010; Feng and 
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Humphries, 2012; Tu, 2005; Cantor and Rosentraub, 2012), area-specific job growth 
(Austrian and Rosentraub, 2002), and secondary construction (Chapin, 2004). 
SAGs act directly to invigorate an urban space by attracting individuals to visit an 
area.  These visitors form a critical mass and thereby create demand that is met by the 
opening of additional business and services nearby. In the past, researchers have shown 
major league facilities to directly contribute to redevelopment by offering an appealing 
amenity (Tu 2005) particularly when located downtown (Johnson, 2013), varying the 
hours that the neighborhood is used, and attracting new residents (Rosentraub, 2011). 
Stadiums and SAGs are popular with government officials because they believe they act 
as an initial investment to jumpstart the areas development, creating an area that is 
attractive to private investments (Delaney and Eckstein, 2007).   
Stadiums without an urban development plan and lacking a larger public-private 
framework for additional investments have been unsuccessful in the past, indicating that 
such projects will not work as an isolated investment (Rosentraub, 2011; Chapin, 2004). 
However, stadiums can also indirectly affect the area, acting as a fulcrum or catalyst to 
attract further investment into low-value neighborhoods (Curry, Shwirian and Woldoff, 
2004; Rosentraub, 2011). The attraction of further development can come during the 
negotiations over the public contribution to the stadium or later as the market reacts to the 
presence of potential customers visiting the area (Chapin 2004). While those secondary 
investments are made in addition to the stadium, the causal effect of the stadium should 
include them if they would not have happened if the stadium had not built.  
One motivation for the government’s investment in the neighborhood, whether 
through a SAG or another type of public project, is to encourage private investment that 
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would otherwise avoid the area. Developers prefer safe profits, and an area in need of 
redevelopment may stall and suffer the collective action problem of the first mover 
impasse, whereby agents each wait for another to take the risk of making the opening 
move. For the most successful stadiums, particularly San Diego and Cleveland, this 
indirect effect is the critical assumption researchers make in estimating that the stadium 
has had a large impact.  
However, the role of location choice for SAGs has not been explicitly studied, 
though researchers often describe how preexisting features of the area have been 
important to the resulting rejuvenation. While it is largely unstated in the literature, I 
assume that that neighborhoods must also have potential for increased rents and home 
values through the presence of under-utilized resources that are attractive to private 
investors, such as proximity to employment, land near natural water, historic but 
underutilized buildings, transportation linkages, or a central location regionally (Smith, 
1979). 
It is worth noting that initial boosts in visitation directly driven by the stadium 
will later decline as the “honeymoon effect” recedes (Clapp and Hakes, 2005; Leadley 
and Zygmont, 2005). Attendance generally falls off in the years following the opening of 
a new stadium, which means a reduced demand for additional services. Therefore, relying 
on the demand of visitors to the SAG will only produce a short term effect in the area, so 
it is assumed that for the area to successfully redevelop additional investments must be in 
place and occur soon after the stadium opens. 
The introduction of a stadium serves as a focusing event for the neighborhood, 
providing the area a new starting point from which redevelopment can follow a narrative 
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structure (Buist and Mason, 2010; Neisser, 1997). While this redevelopment should be 
viewed as having redirected spending from one part of a city to another, it gives the 
government the opportunity to specify where that spending occurs (Chapin, 2002). 
Government officials may feel compelled to do so because of the association between 
revitalized, vibrant downtowns and the ability to attract workers for the knowledge 
economy (Robertson, 1995; Jang, Hughes & Danielsen, 1997; Rosentraub, 2010). 
Robertson (1995) enumerated three objectives that underlie the SAG strategy. 
First, SAGs should target a blighted area that has been unable to attract private sector 
investments to redevelop. Second, the project should be designed to create spillover 
spending for surrounding businesses, as well as enlivening the area during evenings and 
weekends. To do so, projects should take account of walking distances, exit and entry 
points, crowd flow, and land uses in order to integrate themselves with the surrounding 
urban form (Sternberg, 2002). Third, the SAG should stimulate additional construction in 
the surrounding community.  
1.4 Organization of Remaining Paper 
The following chapter reviews literature to situate my dissertation within past 
studies on sports stadiums as a tool of urban redevelopment. In addition, I discuss 
literature on alternative urban development strategies, public-private partnerships and 
urban renewal. The third chapter details the research methodology and results for the 
quantitative analyses. Specifically, I model the location of minor league baseball 
stadiums and evaluate the total change created by the stadium in the surrounding census 
tracts. Chapter 4 contains the research methodology and results from case studies of the 
stadiums in Toledo, Ohio and Louisville, Kentucky. The case studies analyze the role 
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minor league stadiums played in redevelopment in those cities. Chapter 5 concludes with 
a discussion of the results for both sets of analyses, with a focus on the interpretation as 
well as a comparison of the findings. 
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CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In this chapter I review literature that guides my research and establish new lines 
of inquiry. The first section addresses the history of urban renewal and the tactics that 
federal and local governments have attempted to stem urban decline; the discussion 
establishes sports stadiums as being within a broader set of government-led 
redevelopment policies. The second section discusses the general form of stadium 
subsidies in order to establish the role the state plays in the projects. After the how of 
stadium subsidies is described, the third and fourth section addresses the why of stadium 
subsidies. The third section reviews evaluations of arguments put forward by proponents 
of stadiums about their benefits to society. While other arguments are reviewed, the focus 
is on how stadiums have performed as tools of urban redevelopment and the measures 
used to evaluate projects. The fourth section analyzes the political reasons that 
government officials are willing to subsidize professional sports stadiums and whose 
interests the policy serves. Because scant research exists on minor league sports, the 
majority of literature reviewed concerns major league teams and stadiums. 
2.1 Urban Redevelopment and Renewal 
The problems and debates surrounding sports stadiums are not isolated, as they fit 
within a broad history of attempts by both the federal and local governments to reshape 
cities. Cities and urban areas are a constant focus of governments and researchers due to 
their natural ability to both benefit and impair society. Cities drive the world’s economies 
by making workers more productive and contributing to the rate of knowledge 
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transmission and innovation; however, they simultaneously have been centers of disease, 
filth, and crime (Glaeser, 2011).  
Suburbanization caught policy maker’s attention in the 1940s, but throughout 
human history the ills of cities have driven individuals to live beyond its reaches if 
possible (Jackson, 1985). In New York during the early 1800s, the wealthy began shifting 
out of Manhattan to the less populated Brooklyn as soon as a ferry service allowed them 
to commute for work; the movement outward continued to widen cities radii as 
omnibuses, horescars, and streetcars became available over the decades. In the 1950’s the 
process accelerated as mortgages, cars, and freeways became widely available, 
coalescing to allow individuals to live ever further from the city-center. In the past, city 
boundaries had expanded through consolidation, but political pressures slowed the 
process as the wealthy and middle class established their own municipalities as a form of 
Tiebout (1956) sorting. 
The federal government responded to the struggles of cities with the Housing Act 
of 1949, which provided money for redevelopment projects across the country.  The law 
received broad support, as groups as divergent as businesses, local governments, 
planners, citizens, and advocates for the underprivileged believed its measures would 
invigorate cities (Zipp, 2012). The laws’ greatest legacy was slum clearance, whereby the 
government bulldozed whole neighborhoods in order to make way for new development. 
Many such clearances made room for new expressways and highways to move residents 
in and out of employment centers, further harming cities, while others replaced low-value 
housing with office buildings, skyscrapers, or higher rent apartments (Carmon, 1999). 
Many more homes were destroyed than built through the law, and those that were built 
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were largely for individuals with higher incomes than those that were displaced (Greer, 
1966). There were successes under the Housing Act, such as the renewal of Lafayette 
Park in Detroit or Baltimore’s Charles Center, but the law is remembered more for its 
social injustices and considerable negative effects on the cultural health of cities 
(Teaford, 2000).  
Following urban renewal’s failure, the federal government worked to minimize its 
direct role in redevelopment. Washington did however create various grant programs, 
such as the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) and Urban Development 
Action Grant (UDAG) that gave money to local governments to finance projects with 
more local control and flexibility (Carmon, 1999).  
In place of a federal support, public-private partnerships have become central 
features of urban redevelopment since the 1960s. Public-private partnerships allow 
governments to structure projects while utilizing capabilities and resources from the 
private sector to see them completed. Often, the land used is provided by the government 
out of its holdings inside the city. In addition, tax credits and other inducements have 
been used by governments to attract private sector investment in developments viewed as 
high risk. Convention centers, festival marketplaces, entertainment venues, and sports 
stadiums have all been developed under public-private partnerships (Savas, 2000).  
Despite their ubiquity, public-private partnerships have a consistent set of 
criticisms directed towards them. The tax credits and other tools used to aid developers 
are disparaged for being unnecessary and displacing the tax money the project is 
expected to attract. The projects are accused of serving wealthy interests, and being 
modern versions of the brazen slum clearance that occurred under urban renewal in the 
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1950’s and 60’s. Finally, the public benefits of the projects, which motivate the 
contribution of governments, are said to never materialize. The core criticism of the 
government’s involvement and support for private projects, whether stadiums, 
convention centers, or others, relates to the imbalance of benefits; residents perceive that 
the majority of profits accrue to private interests while the public is left paying a 
disproportionate share of the cost. 
Governments, both federal and local, have looked beyond the reconstruction of 
the built environment to encourage growth. In order to incentivize businesses to relocate 
in blighted urban areas, governments have offered businesses tax concessions and 
reduced regulations if they reside in enterprise zones. Evaluations have shown mixed 
effects on enterprise zones’ ability to create new employment and redirect economic 
activity, in part because of the difficulty of capturing sufficient revenues to offset the 
costs of the program (Billings, 2008; Neumark & Kolko, 2010; Peters & Fisher 2007). 
As the economy has shifted from a manufacturing to technological base, 
education and employee attraction has taken on increasing importance for sustaining 
growth. While in former decades cities focused on large redevelopment projects to 
attempt to attract workers back downtown, recently smaller, more flexible changes have 
become popular as Richard Florida’s (2002) theory of the Creative Class has gained 
acceptance among planning professionals. Florida argues that knowledge workers are 
attracted to tolerant mores, talented coworkers, and technological employment and cities 
should stress these features to attract future growth. Florida’s theory has undergone 
similar criticisms to that of urban renewal for ignoring the needs of the underprivileged 
(Leslie and Catungal, 2012; McCann, 2007) but it shows the permanence of governments 
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hoping to achieve growth by whatever means.  
2.2 How the Public Subsidizes Stadiums 
Every funding agreement for a sports facility is unique, but general themes across 
major and minor league facilities bear discussing. For the last half-century, the majority 
of funding for stadiums and arenas has come from public sources. Judith Longs’ (2005) 
research on the long-term trends in stadium financing (Table 2.1) shows that facilities are 
receiving a lower share of their funds from the public over time despite becoming more 
regular and expensive. 
The primary financing vehicle for stadiums comes from municipal bonds issued 
by either the city or county hosting the stadium. Governments issue bonds in order to 
raise money for the initial construction, which also requires them to pay for the 
development over the life of the bond.  In order to retire the debt, either services must be 
reduced or taxes increased; normally, during the debate on the subsidy a tax increase is  
Table 2.1 Stadia Construction Costs 
Time Number 
Total 
Cost 
Public 
Cost 
Public 
Share 
1950-59 6 51 51 100% 
1960-69 25 126 98.3 78% 
1970-79 28 132 117.5 89% 
1980-89 14 157 103.6 66% 
1990-99 52 226 128.8 57% 
2000-05 20 314 210.4 67% 
Source: Long, 2005. 
 
specified, commonly being on general sales, cigarettes, alcohol, tourism, or state lotteries 
(Baade & Matheson, 2012; Senkiewicz, 1998). The practice of issuing tax-exempt bonds 
for stadiums has come under increasing public scrutiny because of its national 
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implications.12 Tax exemptions from interest paid on municipal bonds eliminates revenue 
for the federal government, meaning that that entire nation is affected by each local 
decision.13  
The land that the stadium is built on is also a component of the construction costs. 
Often, stadiums are built on land which the government owns portions of; but the 
government can also use its resources to aid the process of acquiring land they do not 
own. For instance, they can arrange land swaps from their own properties or negotiate a 
simple purchase. Finally, public utilities such as roads and sewers often must be built or 
updated when a stadium is being constructed, a responsibility that normally falls upon the 
government (Noll & Zimbalist, 1997). 
Teams are also responsible for some portion of the stadium costs in most cases. 
Similar to governments, teams can sell bonds to investors and use revenue from the 
stadium to cover portions of its construction costs. Shares of the financing have also 
come directly from the wealth of team’s owners, though that is not common or a large 
portion of the total cost when included. Finally, many franchises have begun selling 
personal seat licenses (PSLs) in the last decade, which involves an upfront payment by a 
fan for the right to purchase season tickets in a specific seat or seats. The license can be 
transferred, but if the fan forgoes buying season tickets in the future the money is not 
returned (Baade & Matheson, 2012).  
 
12The use of tax-exempt bonds was actually altered by the 1986 Tax Reform Act, which closed off federal 
subsidies for projects if more than 10 percent of the debt is covered by revenue from the stadium. While the 
law was intended to hamper stadium subsidies, it may have made the revenue received by the government 
smaller by capping its percentage at 10 percent. 
13 Bloomberg gathered data on stadium deals and calculated that through 2047, when the final bond 
currently issued is retired, the Federal Government will have lost $4 billion in revenue 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-09-05/in-stadium-building-spree-u-s-taxpayers-lose-4-
billion 
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The majority of stadiums are owned by the cities or counties that finance the 
project while teams occupy them as part of a lease.14 When a team opens a new stadium 
or moves to a new city, they typically sign a long-term lease as part of the deal, generally 
ranging from twenty to thirty years (Baade & Matheson, 2012). However, as the initial 
lease expires, teams often sign shorter renewals while looking towards a new stadium or 
threatening to relocate. Leases call for an annual payment to rent the stadium that 
generally sit between $10 and $20 million15 for major league sports and $1 and $5 
million in the minor leagues (Long, 2012).  
The lease outlines how concession, parking revenue, stadium naming rights, and 
other revenue sources are distributed between the team and stadium owner. Arthur 
Johnson (1995), surveyed team employees and governments in the early 1990’s and 
found: 
Only 19.1 percent (89) reported sharing stadium advertising receipts; 33.0 
percent (88) reported sharing concession revenues; and 46.0 percent (37) 
of those communities whose teams generated parking revenue shared 
parking fees (p. 26). 
 
Thus, while it is not uncommon for governments to receive some revenue from the 
stadiums, the relationship is unbalanced. The primary public concern with the amount 
paid from the lease or revenue is whether they cover the annual debt payments on the 
stadium for the city or county; too often, research has found that to not be the case 
(Goodwin, 2002; Safir, 1997). 
 
14 Teams may be disinterested in owning the stadium, because it would reduce their leverage to move to 
another city when they desire a new stadium in the future. 
15 Leases can also be considerably lower. For instance, the Kannapolis Intimidators in Single-A baseball 
recently signed a lease for $1, though it also includes that the team is responsible for all maintenance costs 
on an aging facility. 
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2.3 Why the Public Funds Sports Stadiums 
The preceding section analyzed the how of public financing for sports deals; the 
following discussion addresses the why from two dissimilar, yet complementary 
perspectives. The first discusses the arguments that politicians make about how a stadium 
benefits the public. There are three such types of explanations: economic, intangible, and 
urban redevelopment. The section briefly reviews the first two, but focus on urban 
redevelopment. The second subsection discusses the reasons that politicians support 
stadium subsidies from the standpoint of political economy. I review literature about the 
public popularity of stadium subsidies as well as how the Logan and Molotch’s theory of 
the urban growth machine explains politician’s behavior. 
2.3.1 Economic Benefits  
The primary logic behind public funding for early stadium projects, particularly 
those built during the 1980s and 1990s, was that they would increase regional 
employment and incomes (Chapin, 2004). Proponents of building sports facilities often 
referenced their ability to boost the local economy, citing economic impact studies 
claiming that a new facility will generate an increase in local income, tax receipts, and 
employment (Coates & Humphreys, 2008; Zimbalist, 2010). However, these studies often 
struggle with basic components of cost-benefit analyses. For instance, they commonly 
did not account for displacement effects, whereby fans at the stadium are no longer 
spending their leisure money at theatres or films within the city. Economic impact studies 
also overstated the number of fans from outside the region that would visit the stadium 
and used grossly oversized multipliers to enlarge the total impact (Noll & Zimbalist, 
1997).  
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Over time, an academic consensus has solidified that the economic benefits 
promised by stadium proponents were never materialized (Baade, 1996; Baade, 
Baumann, & Matheson, 2008; Baade & Dye, 1988; Coates & Humphreys, 1999; 
Siegfried & Zimbalist, 2000). A 2008 literature review of peer-reviewed articles by 
economists found little support for the assertion that construction of a sports facility had 
any positive effect on the local economy, once the cost of the stadium is accounted for 
(Coates & Humphreys, 2008).  
However, those studies focused on sports at the highest professional levels. Agha 
(2011) found a positive effect on income for regions with Triple-A and High-A minor 
league baseball teams as well as Double-A and rookie stadiums, while all other levels of 
competition were insignificant. The fact that the positive results capture such a wide 
range of leagues indicates there is not a specific level of competition that makes for the 
best investment, but rather that minor league baseball has the potential to be beneficial 
overall. While Agha’s results are mixed, they stand in contrast to the negative impact she 
hypothesized for minor league baseball and were taken as an indication that the 
distinctive structures of minor league baseball may generate unique effects on host 
communities where there are fewer competing amenities.  
2.3.2 Intangible Benefits 
As the academic consensus was solidifying against the economic benefits of 
sports stadiums, researchers began turning their attention to new justifications for stadium 
projects, such as intangible benefits. Intangible benefits of sports teams refers to concepts 
such as city pride, community solidarity, community excitement, publicity, social 
bonding, and the pleasure of being a fan that individuals or the region collectively receive 
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(Crompton, 2004). These concepts are considered intangible because they are not directly 
measurable, but economists have used several strategies to quantify their value. Every 
study on the topic has been able to identify intangible benefits of some quantity, no 
matter the decade, location, or methodology.  
Researchers have focused on two broad categories of non-economic benefits. The 
first set is the private consumption goods, identified as consumer surplus based on the 
price of attending a game. Second, researchers have identified public goods generated by 
sports teams and stadiums, such as fandom and civic pride. These are non-use values, 
because fans and non-fans share them while only users gain a consumer surplus. 
Consumer surplus is the difference between the maximum an individual is willing 
to pay for a good, in this case a ticket, and the amount actually paid. The logic behind 
such studies is that if the public subsidizes a stadium that otherwise would not be built, 
the subsidy is responsible for generating that consumer surplus. When aggregated for a 
city or region, the net consumer benefit “represents a benefit of a stadium” to the public 
(Irani, 1997, p.13). Sporting events have generally been found to be inelastic, meaning 
that fans will pay more for them regardless of the price charged and thus they generate a 
considerable consumer surplus (Domazlicky & Kerr, 1990; Irani, 1997).16  
The critical question then, is whether the consumer surplus generated is enough to 
justify the public expense on the stadium. Despite all studies finding evidence of a 
consumer surplus, the sizes differ considerably between different teams and leagues. For 
 
16 Irani (1997), as already discussed, calculated -0.35. Scully (1989) and Coffin (1996) calculated similar 
elasticity’s of -.63 and -.68, Bruggink and Eaton (1996) find an elasticity of -1.87. Irani (1997) cites Scully 
as confirmation that his elasticity conforms to past estimates, in addition to Domazlicky and Kerr (1990) 
who calculate the elasticity to be -.23. Finally, Whitehead et al. (2011) calculate demand elasticity’s for 
Calgary and Edmonton of -.57 and -.77, 
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example, Irani (1997), who only studied Major League Baseball, found that in many 
cases the consumer surplus was large enough to pay for the stadium. Conversely, 
Alexander, Kern, and Neill (2000) studied all of the Big Four sports and found that in 
most cases the total amount was too small. Whitehead, Johnson, Mason, and Walker 
(2013) found that under certain specifications a facility could be justified, but generally 
the amount was less than a stadiums total cost.  
The second prominent way of quantifying intangible benefits is using Contingent 
Valuation Method (CVM). For CVM, individuals within the team’s region are surveyed 
to ascertain how much they are willing to pay for the stadium. CVM is an attempt to 
measure how much each individual values the team, whether they use it (attending or 
watching games) or not (enjoy being in major league city, civic pride, water cooler talk, 
etc.). The approach is also a prominent method for measuring other intangible goods such 
as clean air or protecting undeveloped land (Chestnut & Dennis, 1997). 
The first effort at applying CVM to sports facilities came from Johnson and 
Whitehead (2000), who analyzed the public benefits of a new basketball arena for the 
University of Kentucky Wildcats and a minor league baseball stadium in Lexington. 
Their analysis, which showed the public benefits were not large enough to justify 
building the facilities with subsidies, proved the viability of applying CVM to the 
question at hand. 
Numerous further studies have been done using CVM to ascertain the willingness 
to buy a team (Johnson, Groothuis, & Whitehead, 2001), to attract a new team to a region 
(Santo, 2007), its additional values located downtown versus in the suburbs (Johnson, 
Whitehead, Mason, & Walker, 2012), and the general value of a team (Owen, 2006). 
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Across these cases, the public generally is not willing to pay enough to match the public’s 
typical contribution towards stadiums.  
2.3.3 Urban Redevelopment 
As urban redevelopment became a more prominent goal of sports facility projects, 
the physical form of the stadiums and arenas changed as well. During earlier phases when 
regional growth was the primary goal, outdoor sports such as baseball and football were 
increasingly played under domes, and facilities of all types were placed in isolated areas, 
beset on all sides by parking with no intention that customers should interact with the 
surrounding community (Chapin, 1999). Modern stadiums have been built with a greater 
intention to blending into surrounding architectural forms, adding vibrancy to an area, 
and contribute to economic growth on a sub-regional level (Cantor, 2014). 
Table 2.2 Summary of Stadium Evaluations on Urban Redevelopment 
Authors (Year) City Measure 
Ahfeldt and Maenning (2010) Berlin Housing Values 
Ahfeldt and Kavetsos (2015) London Housing Values 
Austrian and Rosentraub (2002) 
Cleveland, Columbus, 
Cincinnati, and Indianapolis 
Employment Growth 
Austrian and Rosentraub (1997) Cleveland Employment Growth 
Cantor and Rosentraub (2012) San Diego 
Housing Values and 
Demographics 
Chapin (2004) Cleveland and Baltimore Urban form 
Dehring, Depken and Ward (2007) Dallas Housing Values 
Feng and Humphreys (2012) 
Nationwide; Every NFL, NBA, 
MLB, and NHL facility 
Housing Values 
Johnson (1995) Harrisburg and South Bend Urban form 
Kavetsos (2011) London Housing Values 
Rosentraub 1997 12 Cities 
Population and 
Employment Growth 
Rosentraub, 1999 Phoenix and Indianapolis Tax Receipts 
Tu (2005) Landover Housing Values 
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The shift in stadium attributes bespoke a modification in how the projects have 
been evaluated. Early studies attempting to measure broad economic growth were all 
measuring the effects of the stadium at the city or regional level, but more recently 
facilities have been evaluated at the sub-city or neighborhood level. In addition, the 
measures used to study the project have shifted slightly, focusing more on housing 
market changes or changes in the urban form of an area, as shown above in Table 2.2.  
Studies of stadiums are normally done through case studies, which has led to 
several cities becoming prominent examples of a successful sports led redevelopment 
strategy. For instance, Downtown Indianapolis (Austrian & Rosentraub, 2002; 
Rosentraub, 1997), Cleveland (Chapin, 2004) and San Diego (Cantor & Rosentraub, 
2012) all experienced rejuvenation aided by a redevelopment strategy centered on sports 
facilities, though they followed distinct paths. Sports has helped Indianapolis to turn a 
torpid downtown into a vibrant center of activity, based on the restaurants and retail that 
three sports facilities (NBA, MiLB, and NFL) have attracted. Indianapolis has also 
become a center for amateur competition, in part because it is the location of the national 
offices for the National College Athletic Association (NCAA) and because it has the 
facilities to host events. In Cleveland, tourist attractions such as the Rock & Roll Hall of 
Fame coupled with three sports facilities (NBA, MLB, and NFL) have helped to attract 
individuals to live and visit downtown despite a struggling economy. Finally, San Diego 
built Petco Field for MLB’s Padres in the Gas Lamp District, a historically distressed 
neighborhood. However, part of the stadium financing deal required the injection of 
private development capital into the surrounding neighborhoods, which has spurred a 
revival of an area where few tourists had ventured. 
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Arthur Johnson (1995) conducted case studies of minor league baseball stadiums 
in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and South Bend, Indiana that were planned for downtown 
redevelopment. The Harrisburg stadium was intended to revitalize and provide a greater 
connection between Harrisburg’s downtown and a stretch of underdeveloped land called 
City Island. South Bend’s stadium was designed to provide another means for 
entertainment for residents and tourists, and was part of an overall entertainment strategy 
along with other attractions. Both case studies were conducted soon after the stadiums 
opened and owing to the short time horizon no quantitative effects were discussed, but 
local officials reported positively about the projects. 
However, not all sports projects have been successful. Projects in Baltimore 
(Chapin, 2004) and Phoenix (Buckman & Mack, 2012; Rosentraub, 1999) were evaluated 
and shown not to have contributed to redevelopment in those cities. Researchers have 
found that stadium projects have failed in the past because of a lack of appropriate 
consideration of urban form (Buckman & Mack, 2012), too much regional emphasis on 
suburbanization (Rosentraub, 1999), or because of a lack of subsequent investments to 
generate meaningful growth for surrounding neighborhoods (Chapin, 2004). 
Finding universal lessons on how governments should utilize a sports stadium for 
redevelopment can be difficult because each city’s context and conditions differ 
substantially. In his 2010 book Major League Winners, Mark Rosentraub recommends 
that for cities to maximize their return on redevelopment investments, stadiums should be 
surrounded by a concentration of other amenities, fit into the neighborhood’s 
architecture, and that public dollars should have a signed commitment for private dollars 
as well.  
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The argument in favor of anchoring urban redevelopment with a sports facility is 
not that a stadium will attract residents and raise home values by itself, but rather that it 
will attract other investments that will cumulatively revitalize the area. Stadiums and 
arenas contribute to redevelopment by anchoring the area, displaying the city’s 
commitment to surrounding neighborhoods, and attracting private capital (Chapin, 2004). 
The causal effect runs through sports facilities as the starting point, without which the 
secondary development never would have occurred.  
It is not only politicians and developers that value sports led redevelopment; 
Johnson, Whitehead, Mason, and Walker (2012) used contingent valuation method and 
found that residents in two Canadian hockey cities were willing to pay more for arenas to 
be located centrally rather than in the suburbs. However, the value that individuals place 
on living near a new stadium has had mixed findings. Tu (2005) found in Landover, 
Maryland that properties near the new football stadium FedEx Field sold at a discount 
relative to comparable units away from it, showing that individuals did not value 
proximity to that new amenity. Conversely, Feng and Humphreys (2012) showed that 
results for a national sample of nearly every stadium and arena project in the MLB, NFL, 
NBA and NHL had positive effects at the census block level.  
2.4 The Politics of Sports Subsidies  
Professional sport teams are ready and willing to relocate to a new city unless 
their demands for a new facility are met. The trend began in 1953 when the Boston 
Braves moved to Milwaukee, which was the first relocation to occur in major league 
baseball in half a century. Following the move, teams realized the allure of untapped 
markets and new stadiums, and began auctioning their services to the highest municipal 
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bidder. In the last few decades, professional sports leagues have even been accused of 
disallowing expansion (the creation of new franchises) in willing markets in order to 
maintain the threat of relocation (Zimbalist, 2010). In American society, professional 
sports have a high profile, and losing a team makes a city appear to be in decline 
(Shropshire, 1995). For cities, teams can be conceived as a form of Thorstein Veblen’s 
conspicuous consumption, and the inability to support and retain a franchise will make 
the city appear to be less than “Major League.” 
However, stadium subsidies are not automatically popular at the polls. Mondello 
and Anderson (2004) found that during the 1990’s, sports subsidies appeared on the 
ballot 26 times with 20 succeeding (77%). That result stems partially from popularity of 
sports, but another component is how the vote is framed. The public still expresses 
support for the idea that a stadium helps the regional economy, despite the clear academic 
consensus against that position. The proponents of subsidies have been shown to 
significantly outspend their opposition, by ratios as large as 20 to 1, helping them to 
frame the issue before the vote (Buist & Mason, 2010). In addition, politicians are skilled 
at avoiding votes when defeat seems likely if they are able to, so there may be selection 
bias in the 26 referenda Mondello and Anderson (2004) studied. The continuing success 
of initiatives to subsidize sports stadiums, and the forces that bring together proponents 
can be explained through Logan and Molotch’s urban growth machine.   
The urban growth machine is an extension of critical theory into local politics. 
Logan and Molotch (1988) focus on “place entrepreneurs” who try to maximize the value 
or rents of land and buildings, in contrast to corporate interests that wish to maximize the 
profit of production. Place entrepreneurs, the center of the urban growth machine, differ 
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from corporate interests in another critical form. While they often work together, they are 
often in tension because corporate interests have the ability to move, which can 
negatively affect an urban growth coalition; urban growth coalitions can fail and 
members can move, but each coalition is tied to a firm location. The urban growth 
machine endeavors to intensify land use through growth, particularly through the increase 
in population of their city or region. The strategies place entreprenuers follow focus on 
expanding commercial land use, attracting corporations and employers, and increasing 
real estate values; what that ignores is quality-of-life issues such as public schools or 
safety.  
The growth machine is dominated by place entrepreneurs, corporations, political 
elites, local media, and utilities as each benefits for their contributions. Place 
entrepreneurs, as already mentioned, are motivated to increase the value of land. 
Corporations enjoy the favorable business conditions that the urban growth machine 
proposes. Political elites gain the backing of moneyed interests in elections as well as the 
prestige of their offices. The local media, particularly the city’s newspaper, are interested 
in increased circulation from population growth and the opportunity for more advertising. 
Finally, utilities participate for reasons similar to newspapers; population growth is the 
only way to increase their services. These groups collaborate, driven by their unique 
interests, to formulate and enforce growth based public policies. Politicians and place 
entrepreneurs work through the media to solidify economic growth as the primary goal of 
the city, arguing that it is a universal positive and will provides jobs and cultural 
opportunities to citizens.  
The specific strategies the urban growth coalition utilizes have shifted over time. 
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The coalition still focus on a consistent message through the local media centered on the 
benefits of growth, but as the industrial economy has decline they have been forced to 
decrease their emphasis on tax incentives for large employers. New economic 
development strategies have intensified, as urban growth machines now “compete for the 
right mix of local spoils from the transnational web of commodity chains, streams of 
tourists and conventioneers, advanced service industries, innovation clusters, and rapidly 
shifting niche consumption spectacles” (McCallum, Spencer, & Wyly, 2005, p. 30). 
Sports have always been an aspect of the urban growth coalition theory. Logan 
and Molotch (1988) acknowledged sports central place in American culture: 
The athletic teams in particular are an extraordinary mechanism for 
instilling a spirit of civic jingoism regarding the “progress” of the locality. 
A stadium filled with thousands (joined by thousands more at home before 
the TV) screaming for Cleveland or Baltimore (or whatever) is a scene 
difficult to fashion otherwise. This enthusiasm can be drawn upon… in 
order to gain general acceptance for local growth-oriented programs (p. 
315). 
 
The connection between urban growth machines and subsidies for sports stadiums has not 
been lost on subsequent researchers.  
Delaney and Eckstein (2003) studied how urban growth machines succeeded and 
failed in nine American cities. Their research attempted to move the focus of stadium 
initiatives away from the teams themselves and towards the structural processes of local 
urban growth coalitions. Coalitions that could articulate a clear pro-growth vision for the 
city and connect that message to the stadium initiative were successful at building 
stadiums with larger shares of public funding; where urban growth machines were weak, 
stadium subsidies were either smaller or the efforts failed. The outcomes resulted in large 
part from the growth coalition’s ability to control media coverage, ensuring that the 
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balance of discussion of the stadium was positive and particularly that the message 
connected growth with public benefits: 
It is not necessarily that policymakers in strong coalition cities do not care 
about more quality-of-life, neighborhood issues; they just seem more 
likely to believe that community needs will be addressed most adequately 
when the social benefits of new publicly financed stadiums ‘trickle down’ 
to the neighborhoods (p. 351).  
 
The importance of controlling the local media was again apparent in Buist and Mason’s 
(2010) study of newspaper coverage in stadium debates for two public votes in 
Cleveland, Ohio. True to Logan and Molotch’s theory, researchers show that newspaper 
supported both initiatives as evidenced through the content of its coverage. 
“Growth coalitions often favor large, visible projects” and there are few larger 
than the Olympics, which attracts international tourists and delegates to the host city 
(Delaney & Eckstein, 2007, p. 334). Hiller (2000, p. 450) studied the Cape Town, South 
African bid to host the Olympics and found that the effort “was clearly a booster 
mechanism to build consensus around a pro-growth ideology” pushed by the local growth 
coalition. Hall studied the tactics behind bids for sports mega-events, and found that the 
strength and cohesiveness of the urban growth machine was a predictor of their success. 
Finally, McCallum et al. (2005) studied how that urban growth machines had transitioned 
their activities to focus on image-creation activities as part of the shifts in economic 
development strategies. In particular, they studied Vancouver’s Olympic bid (and the 
stadiums it would necessitate) to understand how elites coalesced around new tactics for 
the same interest Logan and Molotch identified.  
2.5 Summary 
There is a long history of government involvement in urban and economic 
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development. As part of those efforts, sports facilities have received increasing funds 
from the public sector, principally since the 1950s. However, since that time the logic of 
public support for such projects has shifted from regional economic benefits to more 
localized urban redevelopment goals. 
Stadiums and arenas have been shown to be successful to a certain extent when 
evaluated on their effects on urban redevelopment; however, existing studies have 
focused on the costlier and less numerous major league facilities. My research builds 
upon those studies, expanding the cities analyzed to those hosting minor league sports. 
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CHAPTER 3 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
Chapter 3 is comprised of two distinct but complimentary sets of quantitative 
analyses. I first determine the demographic and housing predictors of stadium locations 
before evaluating the effects of stadiums on surrounding neighborhoods after one decade.  
I analyze the locations of minor league baseball stadiums both with respect to 
their neighborhood’s qualities at the time that the stadium opened and the changes in the 
neighborhood in the decade preceding construction. The location analysis tests a key 
tenant of the special activity framework, namely that minor league stadiums are being 
placed in areas in need of redevelopment and that they were not undergoing 
redevelopment prior to the stadiums opening. The location analysis is primarily 
concerned with the development position of neighborhoods prior to and at the time of the 
stadiums opening.   
The second section contains the evaluation of stadiums effects against three 
samples of control tracts. By evaluating treated neighborhoods in comparison to both 
their host cities and cities without facilities, the analysis can address whether stadiums 
generate revitalization or growth. The evaluation section focuses on the changes to 
neighborhoods after the opening of the stadium. 
Chapter 3 proceeds by first discussing the shared data sources and sample of 
stadiums for both sets of quantitative analyses (Section 3.1). Section 3.2 contains the 
analysis of stadium locations, including both the methodology and results of the analysis. 
The third section (3.3) discusses the methodology and results for the evaluation of 
stadium effects after opening. While the results are outlined within each section and are 
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summarized in Section 3.4, they are more fully interpreted in Chapter 5. 
3.1 Data Sources 
3.1.1 Data  
The unit of analysis is the census tracts in both quantitative sections because 
stadiums are intended by government officials to have a highly localized impact and 
census tracts are the smallest geography regularly available for analysis longitudinaly 
(Cantor, 2014). Census tracts are an imperfect approximation of neighborhoods, but have 
been commonly used to study urban redevelopment in the past (e.g., Baum-Snow & 
Kahn, 2000; Hammel & Wyly, 1996; Kahn et al., 2010). The Census Bureau designs 
tracts to be relatively homogenous units in regards to population, income, housing, and 
demographics, making them an applicable, though imperfect, representation of 
neighborhoods (Clapp & Wang, 2006). However, because they are established to fit 
arbitrary and consistent sizes17, they cannot replicate the variation in dimensions for 
neighborhoods in every instance.  
I acquired the specific data used from the Longitudinal Tract Data Base (LTDB), 
a dataset built and maintained by researchers at the US2010 project housed at Brown 
University. The LTDB is publicly available decennial census data for every decade 
between 1970 and 2010 that researchers have reconfigured into consistent geographic 
units based on 2010 boundaries (Logan, Xu, & Stults, 2014). Census researchers modify 
their geographies each decade to keep tracts a uniform size across the country, meaning 
that the borders of tracts do not match over time. The LTDB is ideal for the longitudinal 
 
17 Census tracts are designed to each include roughly 4,000 residents. Case in point, in the 2010 LTDB 
data, the mean population for census tracts was 4,158 and the median was 3,958 while the 25 th and 75th 
percentiles were 5,5256 and 2,837 respectively. However, the extremes sway quite far from the ideal, with 
one percent of tracts recording zero residents and the maximum observed was 39,250. 
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study of census data because it makes tracts directly comparable from 1970 to 2010. 
While similar data has been available in the past for a fee from private companies, the 
LTDB is the first source that is publically available. 
I manually collected all data on minor league baseball stadiums through web 
searches. First, I built a list of all minor league baseball teams and their leagues based on 
information available from the MiLB or independent league websites. Using the names 
supplied on the leagues’ lists, I accessed each team’s individual website, from which I 
added information on their stadium name, its opening date, and its physical address. I 
used the stadium’s address and a free geocoding website18 to link each ballpark to its 
longitude and latitude.  
3.1.2. Stadium Sample.  
I limit the sample to stadiums that opened between 1998 and 2002 in order to use 
the 2000 Census as a pretreatment observation. While using 2000 statistics as the time of 
treatment for a stadium built in 1999 is not perfectly accurate, I assume that a stadium’s 
effect would not be visible after two years and the results are substantively similar if 
these stadiums are excluded. I limit my study to stadiums built near the year 2000 
because census data for earlier decades is more likely to be missing in the LTDB, 
affecting the completeness of the sample.  
The stadiums included host teams in Triple-A, Double-A, High-A, and Low-A 
from the MiLB and independent league teams from the Atlantic League of Professional 
Baseball and the American Association.19 In addition, I limit the sample of stadiums to 
those that are in urban areas and close to their cities downtown. A stadium positioned in a 
 
18 geocoder.us 
19 see section 1.2 or Appendix A for a description of the levels of minor league baseball 
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new-build Greenfield site is considerably different in its purposes from a project built 
within a declining industrial section of an inner city (De Sousa, 2000). The special 
activity generator framework is established to evaluate projects located in blighted areas, 
and so suburban projects are not applicable.  
I used the geographic coordinates and the Missouri Census Data Center’s 
(MCDC) Geographic Correspondence Engine to find all census tracts that are treated by 
the new stadium. I identify census tracts as being “treated” if it has a centroid within 1 
mile of the new stadium. A similar operationalization of identifying treated tracts in 
urban redevelopment studies can be found in Kahn (2007) when he studied gentrification 
around new rail transit stations. 
Table 3.1 Stadiums and Cities in Sample 
Stadium City 
Population  
(2010) 
League or  
Level  
Cost  
(2010 $M) 
Opened 
AT&T Field Chattanooga, TN 167700 AA $12.66 2000 
AutoZone Park Memphis, TN 646900 AAA $58.25 2000 
Cambells Field Camden, NJ 77300 ALPB $30.78 2001 
Cambells Field Philadelphia, PA 1,526,000 ALPB $30.78 2001 
Chickasaw Bricktown Ballpark Oklahoma City, OK 580000 AAA $45.75 1998 
Chukchansi Park Fresno, CA 494700 AAA $55.76 2002 
Dozer Park Peoria, IL 115000 Low A $19.39 2002 
Fifth Third Field – Dayton Dayton, OH 141500 Low A $27.86 2000 
Fifth Third Field – Toledo Toledo, OH 287200 AAA $47.51 2002 
Haymarket Park Lincoln, NE 258400 Am. Assoc. $36.36 2001 
Louisville Field Louisville, KY 597300 AAA $49.39 2000 
Raley Field Sacramento, CA 466500 AAA $50.65 2000 
Raley Field West Sacramento, CA 48700 AAA $50.65 2000 
The Ballpark at Harbor Yard Bridgeport, CT 144200 ALPB $25.42 1998 
TicketReturn.com Field  Myrtle Beach, SC 27100 High A $17.02 1999 
U.S. Steel Yard Gary, IN 80300 Am. Assoc. $54.54 2002 
Veterans Memorial Stadium Cedar Rapids, IA 126300 Low A $19.99 2002 
Whitaker Bank Ballpark Lexington-Fayette, KY 295800 Low A $16.62 2001 
 
In total, there were 16 stadiums built between 1998 and 2002 with 64 treated 
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tracts in 18 cities.20 The complete list of stadiums and places studied is provided in Table 
3.1, along with city populations, level of competition, stadium costs21 and year opened.  
3.2 Stadium Locations 
3.2.1 Methodology 
The first quantitative section studies the locations of minor league baseball 
stadiums, both in 2000 and with respect to changes one decade earlier. First, I use a logit 
regression model to see what factors predict that a census tract will be near a new minor 
league baseball stadium. Then, I conduct t-tests for the difference in means for the 
changes in the treatment and control group from 1990 to 2000 to analyze whether 
redevelopment had preceded the stadiums opening. 
The comparison sample of non-treatment tracts is restricted to the same region as 
the stadium in order to ensure that a tract near a stadium built outside the study sample 
(e.g., 2003) will not be used as a control tract. However, choosing the correct geographic 
level to study for each stadium proved problematic. Preferably, I would compare tracts 
near the stadium to other tracts that were also likely to be selected, meaning those within 
the jurisdiction of whatever governmental body contributed to its construction. In order to 
select an appropriate geography, I collected data from The Sports Facilities Report on 
what level of government paid for each stadium in AAA to determine the correct 
geographic level. I analyzed whether stadiums were financed by the city, county, or state 
without regard for how much was contributed: twelve were funded by the city, eight by 
the county, and seven by the state. Six had more than one public body contribute funds 
 
20 The two stadiums that treat tracts in different cities both lay near a river that acts as a city border. Thus, 
the downtowns of both cities lie in close proximity.  
21 Data for stadium costs is described in Footnote 8. 
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and five were financed without public money. Thus, because cities are the most common 
political body to fund stadiums, I limit my sample to the cities in which stadiums are 
located. In several cases, stadiums were near the borders of cities and thus “treated” tracts 
in multiple cities; in such cases, all treated cities are included. In total, the 18 cities in the 
sample comprise a control group of 1,674 tracts to compare against the 64 treated tracts.  
No conditions qualify an area to be near a baseball stadium. However, theory and 
past research can help to guide the variables tested for their relationship with new urban 
redevelopment projects. I hypothesize that stadiums will be located in blighted areas 
because government and developers are likely to view the neighborhoods (if not the 
residents) as benefitting from the increase in activity, and those residents are unlikely to 
be able to prevent the project.  
Affluent, educated residents have fought past redevelopment efforts in the past 
because they were concerned with social disruptions and changes in the community; 
underprivileged communities may have held similar concerns, but were unable to 
successfully organize their efforts (Fainstein, 1986; Squires, 1989). Thus, poverty should 
positively correlate to the chances of a neighborhood being near a stadium while the 
share of residents with a college education should be a negative predictor.  
Median home values should negatively predict the chances of a stadium being 
located near a neighborhood. Property that is more expensive raises the costs of 
construction, and higher home prices imply greater political capital and human capital for 
residents. Similarly, the percentage of homes that are owned by their occupants should 
increase the costs of purchasing land and also imply greater affluence on the part of 
residents. Owner-occupied housing indicates how residential an area is, and with home 
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ownership comes a greater investment in neighborhoods and particularly more resistance 
to change. Perhaps just as importantly, areas were land is owned by more individuals 
would create greater costs and in time and money for land acquisition. 
Race and urban redevelopment have complicated relationships. For many large 
cities, there is a strong correlation between poverty and race, as inner cities have become 
synonymous with the plight of African-Americans. Because African-Americans typically 
possess less political capital, their neighborhoods could be targeted for redevelopment 
efforts as they have been consistently in the past (Fainstein, 1986). Alternatively, 
developers may avoid neighborhoods known to be populated by minorities because of 
fears that suburban customers will not visit a venue in such a location. Thus, there is no 
prediction for how the percentage of minorities will correlate with stadium locations. 
Housing has been proven to go through a process of filtering, whereby older 
stocks of residencies filter to being owned by poorer communities as the rich are drawn 
to new developments (Lowry, 1960). Therefore, housing stocks that are older should 
positively predict the location of stadiums because the property should be less expensive. 
Neil Smith’s (1987) theory of the rent-gap predicts that these locations may also be 
targeted because they can be redeveloped at low costs and turned into premium 
neighborhoods. In addition, the history of revitalization and rebuilding of aging housing 
as part of gentrification in areas like Brownstone Brooklyn indicates that older housing 
can attract new, wealthier residents (Lees, 2003; Osman, 2011). Thus, either because of 
costs or redevelopment potential, older housing stocks should positively predict the 
likelihood of being near a new stadium.  
The housing density and percent of housing that is vacant help to control for the 
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land use in the tract. Neighborhoods that are built with more density would create greater 
difficulty for developers to acquire suitable plots of land. However, the vacancy rate of 
the area, which ranges in the sample up to 68 percent, helps to adjust for how heavily the 
land is used as well as the shape of the built environment. I predict that a higher housing 
density should have a negative effect on being near a stadium, while a higher rate of 
vacant housing should have a positive impact.  
The share of residents that are under eighteen years of age should negatively 
predict the locations of new stadiums. A greater residential concentration can raise the 
costs of purchasing land (similar to median home values and home ownership) and a 
greater number of minors would increase the social impact of dislocations, and therefore 
intensify the complications of the project. 
The final independent variable tested is the percentage of total area within a 
census tract that is water. In the past, bodies of water were often the location of factories, 
but since economic restructuring took hold many have been in need of major 
redevelopment. If an area near water has fallen into blight, developers and place 
entrepreneurs may be particularly keen to locate the stadium near water because of the 
added potential for increased home values in the area. Acquiring the land for waterfront 
stadiums may be more expensive, but the increase in profits for ancillary developments 
would outweigh the added costs because of the amenity. In addition, the history of 
waterfront stadiums indicates that the sign for the percentage of water should be positive. 
If stadiums are located in underdeveloped areas as predicted, then treated tracts 
should be located in a cluster of impoverished tracts (Tannen, 2016). Thus, stadium 
locations may not be determined only by the traits of individual tracts, but rather larger 
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areas of underdevelopment. I include a second version of the location regression in order 
to account for the levels of poverty, home ownership, and housing 30 years or older for 
surrounding tracts. These variables are included in a separate regression in order to 
observe their effect on stadium location as well as their impact on other variables tested. 
I test the location of stadiums using a logit regression, because the dependent 
variable (stadium treatment) only takes the values 0 and 1. In addition to the variables 
listed above, the city for each tract is included to account for regional differences within 
the sample, and robust standard errors are reported to reduce heteroskedasticity.  
The specific measurement of all variables is described in Table 3.2 along with 
summary statistics for the sample, stratified by whether or not the tract is near a stadium. 
Table 3.2 Summary Statistics in 2000 
Name Definition 
Tracts Near 
Stadium 
All Other 
Tracts 
Stadium Treatment 
Tract with a centroid located within 
one mile “as the bird flies” of the 
stadium 
1 0 
% of Housing 30 
Years+ 
Percentage of housing structures that 
were built 30 or more years earlier 
(1970 or earlier) 
72.8% 63.6% 
Housing Density 
Total number of houses per square 
mile (logged in the regression) 
2581 3312 
% of Housing Vacant 
Percentage of all housing units that are 
unoccupied 
14.6% 8.6% 
% of Tract – Water Percentage of total area that is water 8.8% 1.7% 
% of Housing Owner-
Occupied 
Percentage of housing units occupied 
by their owners 
29.8% 59.4% 
Median Home Value 
(Log) 
Median home value $89,677 $116,312 
% in Poverty 
Percentage of residents meeting 
federal definitions of poverty 
35.0% 18.5% 
% of Population 
Under 18 
Percentage of residents below age 18 24.4% 25.7% 
% College Educated 
Percentage of residents that have 
earned a college degree or higher 
14.3% 22.0% 
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Table 3.2 (continued) 
% Minority 
Percentage of that are not non-
Hispanic white 
65.1% 44.3% 
Surrounding % in 
Poverty 
Percentage of residents meeting 
federal definitions of poverty in all 
directly neighboring tracts 
13.4% 16.2% 
Surrounding % of 
Housing 30 Years 
Percentage of housing structures built 
30 or more years earlier in all directly 
neighboring tracts 
59.9% 59.1% 
Surrounding % 
Owner-Occupied 
Housing 
Percentage of housing units occupied 
by their owners in all directly 
neighboring tracts 
51.6% 51.4% 
 
In a separate analysis I study whether there are consistent differences between the 
treatment and control group in demographic and housing changes prior to the stadium 
opening. If neighborhoods near the stadium are found to be improving prior to the facility 
opening it would jeopardize the argument that the project had a significant effect. That 
question is addressed with analyzing the changes from 1990 to 2000 for the treatment and 
control group on the same covariates included in the regression.22 
3.2.2 Results  
The predictors of stadium locations are reported in Table 3.3 as log-odds; the 
specific results and magnitudes I discuss come primarily from the first regression, while 
the second regression is used primarily to analyze the specific effect of the variables for 
the collective traits of the surrounding tracts. Across both sets of regressions, all variables 
are in the direction predicted, though not all differences reach statistical significance. 
The housing qualities of a neighborhood appear to have minimal effect when 
controlling for all else in the model. The share of total housing that is owner-occupied is 
 
22 Water is omitted from the analysis because it did not change in the sample. 
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the only variable that reaches statistical significance in predicting whether a tract will be 
near a new minor league baseball stadium. An increase in home ownership of one-
percentage point lowers the log-odds of the tract being treated by a stadium by .046, 
holding other aspects of the housing stock, presence of water, demographics, and city 
constant.  
Table 3.3 Location Analysis Regression 
 (1) (2) 
 Near Stadium I Near Stadium II 
   
% of Housing 30 Years+ 0.0040 0.0055 
 (0.0093) (0.0098) 
Housing Density (Log) -0.072 -0.035 
 (0.19) (0.19) 
% of Housing Vacant 0.022 0.025 
 (0.023) (0.024) 
% of Housing Owner-Occupied -0.046*** -0.047*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) 
Median Home Value (Log) -0.36 -0.34 
 (0.41) (0.43) 
% of Tract - Water 0.075*** 0.075*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) 
% in Poverty 0.038** 0.037** 
 (0.018) (0.018) 
% of Population Under 18 -0.084*** -0.079** 
 (0.031) (0.031) 
% College Educated 0.00094 -0.00097 
 (0.025) (0.026) 
% Minority 0.033*** 0.030** 
 (0.012) (0.012) 
Surrounding % in Poverty  -0.013 
  (0.032) 
Surrounding % of Housing 30 Years  0.025 
  (0.016) 
Surrounding % Owner-Occupied Housing  -0.097* 
  (0.050) 
Constant 4.03 11.2 
 (5.58) (7.25) 
   
Observations 1,738 1,738 
City FE Yes Yes 
Robust SE Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.47 0.48 
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As hypothesized, stadiums had a strong propensity to locate near water. A one-
unit increase in the percentage of total area in a tract that is water raises the log-odds of 
stadium treatment by .75. These locations help create iconic sightlines, and areas near 
water are often primed for redevelopment after manufacturing has vacated cities. 
The strongest negative predictor in the model is the percentage of residents that 
are under the age of 18. When holding all other independent variables constant, a one-
unit increase in the share of minors lowers the log-odds of a tract being near a stadium by 
.84. While the effect of being residential is also captured by the owner occupied rate, the 
age of residents has an additional influence. 
Two other demographics also have a significant effect on a tracts likelihood of 
being near a new stadium. The share of poverty increased the log-odds by .038 holding 
all else constant, another indication of how important political power is to preventing 
major redevelopment projects. In addition, and perhaps of greatest interest form a 
political economy standpoint, is the significant effect of the percent minority on stadium 
location. Holding all else constant, a one-unit increase in the share of minorities raises the 
log-odds by .033. 
The variables that were insignificant also hold worthwhile information. Older 
housing stock did increase the chances of being near a stadium as predicted, but thirty 
years may not be a long enough time horizon to capture the full effect. With more 
detailed information, particularly with respect to the percentage of housing built prior to 
suburbanization and World War II, the age of the housing stock may have added more 
information to the regression. Housing values were also insignificant, which may be 
because homes themselves are unlikely to be cleared for stadium projects and so the 
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value of residential land has less of an effect than predicted. The same argument holds for 
the housing density in a tract and the residential vacancy rate.  Finally, the share of 
college educated workers is insignificant, but its high correlation with home-ownership 
rates and poverty helps to explain its lack of influence. 
The variables for the collective traits of the tracts surrounding each tract presented 
in column II do not add to the model’s ability to predict stadium locations. For instance, 
the differences between the treatment and control group are much smaller on the 
surrounding traits than those reported for the individual tracts themselves in the summary 
statistics in Table 3.2. In the regression the only variable that is significant is the share of 
owner-occupied housing, and that is only at the .1 level.  
Perhaps of most importance is the lack of effect from the new variables on the 
other measures included in both models. While the magnitudes of some variables did 
shift slightly, in no cases did the significance change. The indication is that the traits of a 
tract and those of the surrounding area are mostly uncorrelated, which contradicts the 
hypothesis that led to their inclusion. The overall lack of significance for surrounding 
tracts indicates that tracts are the correct unit of analysis, and that a broader geographic 
footprint would obfuscate the effects. 
Taken together, these findings indicate that minor league baseball stadiums do 
locate in underdeveloped, blighted areas where residents will have less political voice to 
oppose the project.  
Even if located in blighted areas, stadiums may have been placed where the 
process of redevelopment had already begun, and therefore, would not be the primary 
agent of change. However, the results shown in Table 3.4 for the changes from 1990 to 
 49 
 
2000 for the treatment and control indicate that neighborhoods near the ballpark were not 
already redeveloping prior to the stadium opening. Roughly half of the differences in the 
sample are insignificant at even the .1 level, and those which are significant are 
inconsistent in their direction.  
Median home values were significantly different for the two groups, but declined 
in both and at a faster rate in the treated tracts. Across the country, housing prices 
increased between 1990 and 2000 when adjusting for inflation; however, because the 
sample is constrained to urban areas, of which several are in the rust belt, the total effect 
for both groups was one of continued decline entering 2000. The larger decline near the 
stadium is a clear signal that the areas had not improved prior to the stadium’s opening. 
Table 3.4 T-Test for Changes from 1990 to 2000 
Variable Treatment Control T-Test 
Δ % of Housing 30 Years+ 10.56 11.98  
Δ Housing Density -136.2 9.3 ** 
Δ % of Housing Vacant -1.11 -0.40  
Δ % of Housing Owner-Occupied -0.36 -0.39  
Δ Median Home Value -$14899 -$693 ** 
Δ % in Poverty -1.96 0.97 *** 
Δ % of Population Under 18 -0.84 0.40  
Δ % College Educated 2.23 2.09  
Δ % Minority 5.56 9.77 ** 
 
Housing density also declined near the stadium, which may be a sign of the area 
being cleared for the stadium, but that interpretation is a weak indication that the area was 
already successfully redeveloping. Poverty did decrease near the stadium, the only signal 
of demographic change that would be considered positive. Finally, minorities increased 
in both the treatment and control, but more slowly near the stadium; it is unclear whether 
that findings has implications for the areas potential for urban redevelopment, but it is 
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included for the sake of completeness.  
3.3 Evaluation  
The second quantitative section evaluates stadium projects based on changes in 
the housing value and demographics in surrounding communities irrespective of what 
other investments or strategies are used in the neighborhood. I assume that nothing else 
systematically occurs across the span of my sample in the area I regard as being treated 
by the stadium, leaving the stadium as the primary cause for any observed 
redevelopment. 
3.3.1. Methodology.  
I use the same sample of 16 stadiums and 64 treated tracts as described for the 
location analysis. However, I use three control groups in order to analyze the effect of 
minor league baseball stadiums on urban redevelopment. The three samples allow for the 
testing of the effect of stadiums under different circumstances and act as robustness 
checks on the results.  
The first sample is constructed from all treated and untreated tracts within the 
cities that host minor league teams. Using all tracts allows for a broad comparisons of the 
treatment tracts and the entirety of the city they reside in to serve as a useful point of 
reference for the other samples. The first sample can be considered the primary, or naïve 
test, of the hypothesis that stadiums contribute to urban redevelopment.  
However, differences between the treatment and control group shown earlier in 
Table 3.2 may introduce selection bias, making it more difficult to identify the exact 
effect of stadiums. The fact that treated tracts are shown to generally be impoverished 
and underdeveloped could influence the results in either direction. In order to diminish 
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the effects of selection bias on the results, I use propensity score matching to adjust the 
sample. 
To use propensity score matching, I estimate a model of best fit based on the 
results I derived in Section 3.2. A chi-square test that determines whether significant 
differences between the treatment and control group are present was used to guide how 
many matches are included in the post-processing sample (Ho, Imai, King, & Stuart, 
2007). With only 64 tracts receiving the treatment and 1,674 as potential control tracts 
there were few issues in finding appropriate matches. Ultimately, I matched at a 5-to-1 
ratio reducing the sample from 1,738 to 384. Once the data is limited to a pool of similar 
units, I will run the same parametric model I did for the full sample.  
The third and final sample of control tracts is pulled from metropolitan areas that 
do not host major league sports, Minor League Baseball, or established independent 
league teams. The first two samples test how treatment tracts compare to other tracts in 
their own city, but it is possible that a stadium concentrates naturally occurring 
redevelopment activity in one location, creating a negative effect throughout the rest of 
the city as much as a positive effect in the treated area. 
In order to test whether any effects are from the concentration or growth, I create 
a sample of tracts in cities with no comparable facilities to compare against the treatment 
group. I identify 741 metropolitan and micropolitan statistical areas that built no stadium 
for a major or minor league sports at a level comparable to those included in the 
treatment group.23 The pool of regions without sports provides 49,342 tracts, which if 
 
23 It is possible that professional baseball, hockey, or soccer is being played in these areas. However, these 
leagues would be so insignificant that they are unlikely to command new facilities, thus making it unlikely 
there are any tracts that I would consider “treated” in the control group. In addition, some areas lost a minor 
league baseball team (for example, Richmond, VA) during the period being studied and will be included 
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fully included would threaten the ability of the stadium to reach a minimum detectable 
effect. Therefore, I again use propensity score matching to create a more comparable and 
balanced sample. 
I use the same matching model that I employed to construct the second sample, 
except for the addition of two new variables: total population and median income for the 
metropolitan area in 2000. As Davis (2006) shows, these variables are highly predictive 
of whether a MSA hosts a minor league team and I want to ensure that I am comparing 
not just similar tracts, but tracts within cities and regions that are reasonably similar. 
Because most metropolitan areas without professional teams do not have comparable 
median incomes or populations, it was more challenging to find suitable matches in this 
sample. However, I am able to match at a 2-to-1 ratio, providing a total sample size of 
192. The list of cities that are included in the third sample are listed in Appendix B. 
Across all samples, I test the treatment of receiving a stadium using a simple 
binary variable indicating whether the census tract does or does not have a centroid 
within one mile ‘as the crow flies’ of the new stadium. I analyze redevelopment with five 
dependent variables, in order to capture different aspects of the process that proxy for 
outcomes that Robertson (1995) identifies as being elements of special activity 
generators. No one census variable can capture the full result of redevelopment, so the 
five variables are themselves a form of triangulation. The LTDB has data allowing me to 
test whether the area appears rejuvenated and enlivened, in addition to the presence of 
new residential construction. 
The first dependent variable is the percentage change in median home values 
 
among those without a team because my assumption is that their facility was ageing and their inability to 
replace it was part of the reason that they lost the team 
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(adjusted for inflation), which reveals whether individuals place a greater value on living 
near a minor league baseball stadium, similar to Feng and Humphries (2012). In addition 
to the stadium, changes in the residential vacancy rate for the neighborhood should 
negatively affect housing prices. Land that is near water should also be primed for 
redevelopment, along with neighborhoods that have older stocks of housing. Finally, the 
percentage of owner-occupied housing in the previous decade should help control for the 
character of the housing stock and whether the area was previously residential. It should 
be noted that median home values are only reported for census tracts with owner-
occupied houses. Therefore, the regressions for median home value have slightly fewer 
observations than the others, as denoted in each table. 
% ∆ Median Home Value
= Stadium Treatment +  % ∆ Vacancy + % of Tract  that is Water 
+   Lagged % Owner − Occupied Housing 
+ Lagged % of Housing 30 Years 
 
While it is expected that a successful redevelopment project would increase 
housing prices, the change in both supply and demand for housing should be evaluated. If 
the supply of housing is increased after the stadium is built, prices may remain steady 
even if the area is more valued by residents. Thus, the second dependent variable tested is 
the percentage change in total housing units to evaluate whether new construction has 
occurred in the area. Housing units are the only type of buildings included in the LTDB, 
meaning it will only measure changes in the residential housing stock and not 
commercial developments.  
The number of housing units is predicted to be affected by the change in the type 
of housing in the area, as areas adding apartment complexes should grow faster than 
those building single-family homes. In addition, the presence of water as an amenity 
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should attract developer’s attention and affect increases in the housing stock. Lagged 
values for the residential vacancy rate, the percentage of owner-occupied housing, the age 
of the housing stock, and manufacturing employment help to proxy for the character of 
the neighborhood. Areas higher on those qualities should be less desirable to developers 
and thus should negatively effect changes in housing stock. 
% ∆ Total Housing Units or Log (∆ Total Housing Units)
= Stadium Treatment +  % Change in Owner − Occupied Housing
+  Percent of Tract −  Water +  Lagged % of Housing Vacant
+  Lagged % Owner − Occupied Housing
+  Lagged % of Housing 30 Years +  Lagged % Manufacturing Workers 
 
The percentage change in population living in the area is the third dependent 
variable. An increased number of residents would introduce greater demand for services 
and help to vary the hours that spaces are populated, a central goal of Special Activity 
Generators. In addition to the stadium, I include controls for changes in the 
unemployment and the type of housing available in the area. Lagged variables for the 
type of housing that was available proxies for the character of the neighborhood one 
decade earlier while the percentage of housing that was vacant helps to control for the 
availability of housing. Finally, the percentage of minorities is included because of 
America’s long-standing issues with residential segregation and the potential that these 
areas would be viewed unfavorably.   
% ∆ Population or Log (∆ Population)
= Stadium Treatment + Change in % Multi − Family Housing
+ Change in % Unemployed +  Lagged % Owner Occupied Housing 
+ Lagged % Minority + Lagged % of Housing Vacant 
 
The fourth dependent variable is the percentage change in vacancy rates. A 
neighborhood with increased value will have a lower amount of its housing stock sitting 
vacant, which harms the vibrancy and safety of an area (Immergluck and Smith, 2006). 
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Vacancy rates are predicted to also react to the prior conditions of the neighborhood in 
terms of the type of housing and resident employment. In addition, changes in the size of 
the population or the housing stock should effect vacancy rates by increasing either the 
demand for or supply of housing.  
∆ % 𝑉𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 
= 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + % ∆ 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + % ∆ 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠
+  𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 % 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠 
+ 𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 % 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 
 
I analyze the percentage change in the median household income as the fifth and 
final dependent variable. Higher incomes would indicate that the area had redeveloped, 
and that there is more money to be potentially spent at local businesses. However, 
changes in median incomes could result from two sources, either a change in the 
composition of the neighborhood and wealthier residents entering, or an increase in 
employment opportunities following the redevelopment. Additional controls for the 
employment and education profile of the tract, both from the time that the stadium was 
built and for the changes following the stadiums arrival are thus included to disambiguate 
the source of increases in local wealth if one is identified. Enrico Moretti (2012) and 
Charles Murray (2013) have studied how regions with higher percentages of college 
graduates have diverged from less well-educated areas, and I expect to see a similar result 
at a more local level. The lagged percentage of manufacturing workers will proxy for the 
type of employment surrounding the area prior to the stadiums opening. I also include 
variables for the changes in the education level or employment profile for the area, which 
should help identify whether the change in neighborhood income result from shifts in the 
residents or growth in local employment; an area with an increasing share of either 
should see positive changes in income. Finally, the change in the poverty rate should act 
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as an additional control for changes in the character of the neighborhood.   
% ∆ Median Income
= Stadium Treatment + ∆ % College Educated + ∆ % 
+ Lag % Professional Workers + ∆ %  Poverty
+  Lagged % College Educated +  Lag % Manufacturing Workers 
 
 Table 5 further defines and specifies each of the dependent variables used. In the 
case of median home values and median incomes, the change is transformed into a 
percentage. For housing and population, separate analyses report the percentage change 
and logged change. With several samples, different transformations of the dependent 
variables allowed for a superior fit of the model because of the presence of extreme 
outliers within the raw change. Finally, the change in the percentage vacancy rate is 
reported as is and should be interpreted as the percentage point change.  
 
Table 3.5 Dependent Variables 
Variable Description Calculation 
% Δ Median Home 
Value 
The percentage change in 
median home value from t-1 to t 
[ Median Home Value (t) – 
Median Home Value (t-1) ] ÷ 
Median Home Value (t-1) 
% Δ Median Income 
The percentage change in 
median income from t-1 to t 
[ Median Income (t) – Median 
Income (t-1) ] ÷ Median Income 
(t-1) 
% Δ Population 
The percentage change in 
population from t-1 to t 
[Population (t) –Population (t-1) 
] ÷ Population (t-1) 
Log Δ Population 
The log change in population 
from t-1 to t 
Log[Population (t) –Population 
(t-1)]  
% Δ Housing Units 
The percentage change in 
housing units from t-1 to t 
[Housing (t) –Housing (t-1) ] ÷ 
Housing (t-1) 
Log Δ Housing Units 
The log change in housing units 
from t-1 to t 
Log[Housing (t) –Housing (t-1)]  
Δ % Vacant 
Change in the percentage of the 
housing stock that is vacant 
% Vacant (t) - % Vacant (t-1) 
 
The regressions report difference-in-differences with two observations for each 
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tract, one from 2000 and a second from 2010. In 2000, all tracts are untreated, but in 
2010, sixty-four take the value of 1 for the stadium treatment variable. Because of the 
two observations, fixed effects are included for time as well as for the cities that each 
tract is located. In a few regressions, either the city or year variable was not statistically 
necessary and so they were excluded. As was done in the location model, robust standard 
errors are reported to reduce heteroskedasticity present in the models. 
3.3.2 Results  
3.3.2.1 Full Sample  
There were two significant findings for the stadium treatment variable in the models 
using the full sample of cities that hosted minor league teams. 
As shown in Table 3.6, the median home prices increased by 20 percent, holding 
changes in the vacancy rate, the presence of water, and the character of housing one 
decade earlier constant. In regards to raw dollar figures, the tracts near the new stadium 
saw increases in their median values by roughly $34,000 even when accounting for 
inflation. 
Median income increased by 8.8 percent near the new stadium. However, it 
requires the interpretation of the other control variables to evaluate whether the increase 
is primarily driven by new residents or increases in wages for existing residents. By 
including the change in the share of college education and professional workers, both of 
which are significant, the model indicates that the result for education is not entirely 
driven by demographic changes. The change in poverty is also significant, which as 
expected has a large negative effect on median incomes. While all three control variables 
for changes are significant, the two lagged variables are not. 
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There were no significant differences in the log of the changes in total housing for 
areas near the new stadiums for the full sample. Increases in the share of multi-family 
housing increased the housing stock holding all else constant, which is an intuitive result. 
Interestingly, the share of vacant housing a decade earlier was positively related to 
increased construction, holding all else constant. Also of note, areas with a higher share 
of minorities in the previous decade saw less housing construction. 
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Table 3.6 Full Sample Results 
 
 
 Median 
Home 
Value 
 Median 
Income 
 Total 
Population 
 Total 
Housing 
 Vacancy 
Rate 
 % Δ  % Δ  Log Δ  Log Δ  Δ % 
           
Stadium 
Treatment 
20.0** Stadium 
Treatment 
8.81*** Stadium 
Treatment 
0.038 Stadium 
Treatment 
0.094 Stadium 
Treatment 
0.21 
(1.21) (2.44) (0.035) (0.026) (0.88) 
% Δ in Vacancy 
-49.2* Δ in %  College 
Educated 
67.1*** Δ in % Multi-
Family Housing 
0.27*** % Δ in Owner-
Occupied Housing 
-0.54 
% Δ in Population 
-2.45 
(7.35) (5.94) (0.050) (0.19) (1.03) 
Percent of Tract - 
Water 
40.0* 
Δ in % 
Professional 
Workers 
39.6*** Δ in % 
Unemployed 
-0.016 Percent of Tract - 
Water 
-0.023 % Δ in Housing 
Units 
2.38 
(5.79) (5.19) (0.073) (0.029) (0.99) 
Lag % Owner-
Occupied Housing 
-21.6** 
Δ in % in Poverty 
-163*** Lag % Owner-
Occupied Housing 
0.21*** Lag % of Housing 
Vacant 
-0.27 
Lag % 
Manufacturing 
Workers 
7.50 
(0.42) (4.10) (0.025) (0.12) (4.11) 
Lag % of Housing 
30 Years+ 
14.6* Lag % College 
Educated 
-2.68 
Lag % Minority 
-0.24*** Lag % Owner-
Occupied Housing 
0.22** Lag % Owner-
Occupied Housing 
-0.63 
(1.93) (2.27) (0.017) (0.011) (2.91) 
  Lag % 
Manufacturing 
Workers 
-7.98 Lag % of Housing 
Vacant 
0.46*** Lag % of Housing 
30 Years+ 
-0.36***  
 
  (7.40) (0.090) (0.0055)   
      Lag % 
Manufacturing 
Workers 
-0.060*** 
  
      (0.00058)   
          
Observations 3,451 Observations 3,476 Observations 3,476 Observations 3,476 Observations 3,476 
R-squared 0.088 R-squared 0.434 R-squared 0.165 R-squared 0.243 R-squared 0.138 
Number of year 2 Number of year 2 Number of year 2 Number of year 2 Number of year 2 
Time FE Yes Time FE Yes Time FE Yes Time FE Yes Time FE Yes 
City FE Yes City FE Yes City FE Yes City FE Yes City FE Yes 
Robust SE Yes Robust SE Yes Robust SE Yes Robust SE Yes Robust SE Yes 
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 A new stadium also had an insignificant effect on the log of change in total population, 
though it was positive for the sample, similar to housing. Areas with a higher share of aging 
housing stock had a negative association with population changes holding all else constant; that 
negative result contrasts somewhat with the positive change for housing prices associated with 
older housing stocks, though the two are not necessarily contradictory. In addition, 
neighborhoods with a larger share of manufacturing workers in the previous decade saw 
decreases in their populations. 
Finally, stadiums did not have a significant effect on vacancy rates for the full sample. It 
should be noted that none of the variables included were significant, which is partially driven by 
the fixed effects and robust standard errors that were included, but also reflects the lack of an 
effect of the stadium on both housing and population.    
3.3.2.2 Matched Sample 
Figure 3.1 displays the improvement in similarity between the treatment and control 
group after using propensity score matching. For each variable, the initial and final standardized 
difference is displayed on the x-axis; the movement towards zero for all variables is indicative of 
the matched samples advantage despite its imperfections. The probability that the treatment and 
control group in the full sample are similar on the variables used to model stadium location is 
less than 1 in 10,000; using propensity score matching at a 5-to-1 ratio raises the probability to 
.148. 
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Figure 3.1 Standardized Differences. 
When the sample is limited to a pool of similar tracts, the stadium treatment variable is 
significant in three regressions as shown in Table 3.7. As was the case with the full sample 
analysis, there are significant differences in the changes for the median home values and the 
median incomes between tracts near stadiums and throughout the rest of the city. However, the 
significance for median income only reaches the .10 level in the matched sample. In addition, the 
change in housing units gains significance and is in the expected direction when using the 
matched sample. 
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Table 3.7 Matched Sample Results 
 Median 
Home 
Value 
 Median 
Income 
 Total 
Population 
 Total 
Housing 
 Vacancy 
Rate 
 % Δ  % Δ  % Δ  % Δ  Δ %  
           
Stadium 
Treatment 
 
25.2*** 
Stadium 
Treatment 
 
7.25* 
Stadium 
Treatment 
 
4.38 
Stadium 
Treatment 
 
7.62** 
Stadium 
Treatment 
 
-0.71 
(0.14) (0.87) (3.97) (0.29) (0.14) 
% Δ in Vacancy 
 
-37.1 
Δ in %  College 
Educated 
 
17.5 
Δ in % Multi-
Family Housing 
 
34.4 
% Δ in Owner-
Occupied Housing 
 
-33.9 % Δ in Population 
 
-18.9* 
(8.95) (21.8) (26.6) (39.1) (1.59) 
Percent of Tract - 
Water 
 
19.0** 
Δ in % 
Professional 
Workers 
 
54.2 Δ in % 
Unemployed 
 
-7.34 Percent of Tract - 
Water 
 
27.7 % Δ in Housing 
Units 
 
17.2* 
(0.76) (19.9) (18.5) (5.09) (2.47) 
Lag % Owner-
Occupied Housing 
 
-20.8 Δ in % in Poverty 
 
-189* Lag % Owner-
Occupied Housing 
 
13.8* Lag % of Housing 
Vacant 
 
-34.8* 
Lag % 
Manufacturing 
Workers 
 
6.83 
(43.3) (20.9) (8.33) (4.08) (4.95) 
Lag % of Housing 
30 Years+ 
 
33.2 
Lag % College 
Educated 
 
-7.44 Lag % Minority 
 
-32.3*** 
Lag % Owner-
Occupied Housing 
 
23.4 
Lag % Owner-
Occupied Housing 
 
1.03 
(7.39) (21.2) (5.52) (13.1) (2.48) 
  Lag % 
Manufacturing 
Workers 
 
-29.2 Lag % of Housing 
Vacant 
 
21.8 Lag % of Housing 
30 Years+ 
 
-40.8 
  
 
 (15.7) (20.2) (9.72)   
      Lag % 
Manufacturing 
Workers 
 
-24.0 
  
      (36.1)   
          
Observations 746 Observations 768 Observations 768 Observations 768 Observations 768 
R-squared 0.057 R-squared 0.455 R-squared 0.193 R-squared 0.193 R-squared 0.336 
Number of year 2 Number of year 2 Number of year  Number of year 2 Number of year 2 
Time FE Yes Time FE Yes Time FE No Time FE Yes Time FE Yes 
City FE Yes City FE Yes City FE Yes City FE Yes City FE Yes 
Robust SE Yes Robust SE Yes Robust SE Yes Robust SE Yes Robust SE Yes 
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Several control variables lose their significance across the regressions, though in fewer 
cases do their direction change; making the control and treatment group more similar has, as was 
intended, helped to diminish the effect of the differences in these qualities. However, the 
continued significance of several variables supports the continued use of the full model.  
The only covariate other than the stadium treatment that retains a significant effect on 
median home prices is the presence of water, and in the matched sample it reaches a higher level 
of significance. For median income, the significant effect of changes in education and 
professional employment are lost, though this is largely driven by growth in the standard errors 
rather than a decline in their magnitude. For income, changes in poverty is the only variable that 
is significant. With regard to residential housing vacancy, two variables gain significance that 
did not in the full sample; as expected, an increase in housing or increase in population, holding 
all else constant, is associated with an increase in residential vacancy rates; however, both are 
only significant at the .1 level. 
3.3.2.3 Non-Facilities Sample 
Finally, I evaluate how well tracts near the stadiums performed in comparison to similar 
tracts in other cities that did not build a facility for a comparable professional team. Of 
immediate note in Table 3.8 is that the effects of stadiums on both median home values and 
median income disappears. While these tracts grew faster when compared to their own cities, 
there are no significant differences present when compared against cities without facilities. In 
particular, in the final sample tracts near the stadium grew less slowly than the control group, 
though these differences do not reach statistical significance.  
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Table 3.8 Non-Facilities Sample  
 
 Median 
Home 
Value 
 Median 
Income 
 Total 
Population 
 Total 
Housing 
 Vacancy 
Rate 
 % Δ  % Δ  % Δ  % Δ  Δ %  
           
Stadium 
Treatment 
-10.7 Stadium 
Treatment 
4.18 Stadium 
Treatment 
6.52 Stadium 
Treatment 
18.4*** Stadium 
Treatment 
2.03* 
(1.19) (6.13) (5.49) (5.18) (0.24) 
% Δ in Vacancy 
75.3 Δ in %  College 
Educated 
31.8 Δ in % Multi-
Family Housing 
23.9 % Δ in Owner-
Occupied Housing 
-49.4** 
% Δ in Population 
-7.84 
(30.2) (26.2) (15.8) (20.4) (2.41) 
Percent of Tract - 
Water 
-4.49 
Δ in % 
Professional 
Workers 
54.0*** Δ in % 
Unemployed 
-45.5*** Percent of Tract - 
Water 
3.98 % Δ in Housing 
Units 
9.16** 
(8.60) (17.0) (16.8) (15.6) (0.40) 
Lag % Owner-
Occupied Housing 
35.7 
Δ in % in Poverty 
-221*** Lag % Owner-
Occupied Housing 
28.5** Lag % of Housing 
Vacant 
-14.6 
Lag % 
Manufacturing 
Workers 
7.58 
(66.3) (15.0) (11.9) (21.1) (9.63) 
Lag % of Housing 
30 Years+ 
58.0* Lag % College 
Educated 
11.5 
Lag % Minority 
-11.5 Lag % Owner-
Occupied Housing 
32.4*** Lag % Owner-
Occupied Housing 
2.81 
(15.2) (18.9) (9.05) (11.6) (2.39) 
  Lag % 
Manufacturing 
Workers 
-30.7 Lag % of Housing 
Vacant 
11.9 Lag % of Housing 
30 Years+ 
-11.7 
  
  (27.9) (22.1) (9.00)   
      Lag % 
Manufacturing 
Workers 
-51.1* 
  
      (27.01)   
          
Observations 372 Observations 384 Observations 384 Observations 384 Observations 384 
R-squared 0.265 R-squared 0.543 R-squared 0.648 R-squared 0.759 R-squared 0.249 
Number of year 2 Number of year 2 Number of year  Number of year  Number of year 2 
Time FE Yes Time FE Yes Time FE No Time FE No Time FE Yes 
City FE Yes City FE Yes City FE Yes City FE No City FE Yes 
Robust SE Yes Robust SE Yes Robust SE Yes Robust SE Yes Robust SE Yes 
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Two variables for the stadium treatment do reach or exceed .1 levels of 
significance though.  Similarly, to the matched sample, the change in total housing is 
significant and is shown to increase for the treatment group. Relative to tracts in other 
cities, housing near the stadium grew 18 percent faster. 
The second significant treatment effect is for residential vacancy rates. While 
vacancy rates did not differ between the treatment and control in either sample from cities 
hosting teams, they increased near the stadium relative to other cities. Because the 
difference in the change in housing is larger between the treatment and control group for 
the final sample, with again no significant changes in the population, it is predictable that 
we would observe a rise in the vacancy rate 
3.4 Summary  
The quantitative analysis evaluated minor league baseball stadiums within the 
Special Activity Generator framework. First, the findings indicate that stadiums do locate 
in areas characterized by blight. Furthermore, the areas that stadiums are placed in were 
not improving prior to the stadiums arrival.  
Analyzing the changes in those areas one decade after stadiums opened, there was 
a significant increase in median home values, median incomes, and new housing 
construction relative to similarly blighted tracts in the same cities. However, in 
comparison to a sample of cities that built no stadiums during the study period, most of 
the significant effects were not present. Specifically, the magnitude for the positive effect 
of stadiums on housing construction increased, and there was also an increase in the 
residential vacancy rates in those communities. 
In Chapter 4, case studies are used to help explore several questions left by the 
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quantitative analysis. In particular, the study of particular cities will allow me to test the 
assumption that the stadium should be credited with the total effect of the change in the 
area. In addition, the case studies will allow for a further testing of the Special Activity 
Generator framework because of the ability to use new data to track the blight, vitality, 
and secondary developments around stadiums.  
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CHAPTER 4 
CASE STUDIES 
 
Chapter 4 is comprised of three parts. In the first section I review the 
methodology used in both case studies, specifically the sources and collection of data. 
The second and third sections discuss the two cases of Toledo, Ohio and Louisville, 
Kentucky individually. I analyze first how each city evolved and declined, then the more 
specific status of the neighborhoods prior to the stadiums opening, before analyzing the 
changes since the year 2000. With the total scale of the change addressed, I examine what 
share of the resulting redevelopment should be attributed to the stadium and whether or 
how the cities have been able to attract secondary investments. In Chapter 5, I compare 
the two cities and address how the cases help to inform the quantitative analysis in 
Chapter 3. 
Both cases provide evidence of the impact a stadium can have as a catalyst of 
urban redevelopment, but perhaps more importantly, they also show the limitations of 
such public investments. Alone, a minor league baseball stadium will not revitalize a city, 
but if paired with an intentional strategy and co-located with additional amenities, it can 
be part of a successful transformation of urban neighborhoods.  
4.1 Research Methodology 
Chapter 3 measures the total effect of a stadium on surrounding neighborhoods, 
but is unable to identify the exact role of the stadium in ancillary investments. Case 
studies can better analyze the importance of the minor league stadium to the resulting 
redevelopment outcome. An important assumption of the Special Activity Generator 
framework is that stadiums act as a catalyst to further development by directly attracting 
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private investment into the area. More specifically, in Chapter 3 I hypothesize that 
stadiums have a significant and direct effect upon the attraction of private investments 
into the area, justifying my attribution of the total effect of redevelopment to their 
presence. With the case studies, I will attempt to isolate the direct and indirect effects of 
the stadium on urban redevelopment based on a combination of archival and interview 
data.  
I selected two case studies from the sixteen stadiums built in urban locations 
across the country between 1998 and 2002 used in the quantitative analysis in Chapter 3. 
The reason for using those stadiums is partially practical, because it allows me continued 
use of pre- and post-treatment data to identify which stadiums were most and least 
successful as redevelopment projects. In addition, it forms a direct link between the two 
analyses, allowing further insight into the reasons that stadiums built around the year 
2000 were able to concentrate redevelopment, as shown in Chapter 3.  
I used two cases studies to analyze cities with results at opposite ends of the 
sample, in order to consider the causes and nature of different outcomes stemming from 
similar projects. The sixteen stadiums were evaluated using an index constructed out of 
the LTDB data and five variables that proxy for aspects of the redevelopment process 
identified by the Special Activity Generator framework as outcomes of successful 
projects: population, median rent, housing units, vacancy rate, and median income.24 For 
tracts marked as treated in Chapter 3, each of the five variables is converted to the 
percentage change in order to see how each individual tract has transformed relative to 
 
24 An earlier version of the evaluation used median rent instead of median housing prices, so that was used 
in the index construction and the section of case studies. Median rent was retained for the case studies 
because two tracts in Toledo had zero owner-occupied houses and therefore did not have data available for 
housing prices. Median rents and median housing prices are correlated at .7 across the data used. 
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their different starting positions. The changes for each tract were then summed for the 
stadium and averaged for the number of tracts before being converted into z-scores. 
Finally, the five numbers were combined into an index and given equal weight; the index 
can be found in Appendix C. 
I use an explanatory comparative case study, relying on multiple types of data to 
triangulate the impact and importance of the stadium on urban redevelopment. The unit 
of analysis for my case studies is the neighborhoods surrounding minor league baseball 
stadiums. I employ the same boundaries as I used in the quantitative study, specifically 
census tracts with centroids within 1 mile of the stadium. 
I use archival data, observations, and interviews as part of the study. The primary 
source of data used for the case studies is interviews I conducted during the spring and 
summer of 2016 with residents of both cities. During the interviews, I spoke with a mix 
of government officials, developers, city residents, nonprofits, and business owners to 
gain a comprehensive understanding of the stadiums’ effect.  
Government officials were asked to comment on the process of building the 
stadium and particularly the intentions of the project. In addition, officials could also 
discuss the economic growth patterns for the city and region and identify any challenges 
or obstacles for the future. I identified government sources by researching the relevant 
agencies that worked with economic or urban development in both cities and sent email 
inquiries to either specific officials or the agency in order to schedule appointments. 
Developers were identified through news queries to locate stories about 
commercial or residential projects in both cities. I asked developers to comment on the 
practice of determining their investment locations, the process of working with city 
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officials, and their observations regarding the changes in the urban cores of the city.  
I also spoke with nonprofits or non-government organizations in both cities, 
particularly those working in housing and redevelopment issues. Nonprofits provide a 
nuanced view of the impacts of redevelopment and particularly the differential effects 
throughout the city. Nonprofits were identified through web queries using key words and 
the names of both cities. 
Business owners were primarily identified through newspaper searches about the 
redevelopment of both cities. In addition, contacts were made during the visits in both 
cities as part of the observation process. Business owners were queried on the success of 
their projects, the changes in the neighborhood, and the rate of change among nearby 
businesses.  
Finally, I also spoke with individuals that are best identified as city residents, who 
could comment on the redevelopment from a civilian perspective without a direct 
investment in the changes. Through the observations I was able to meet and interview a 
mix of long-time residents and recent arrivals in order to gain a broad understanding of 
their views. 
In total, I spoke with thirty-seven individuals, of which twenty were from Toledo 
and seventeen were from Louisville. Across the core research topics of the study, 
theoretical saturation was achieved as codes appeared across conversations and groups. I 
protect the anonymity of my respondents when quoting them by only identifying them by 
which of those five groups they are most strongly associated with for the research; for 
example, whether they are a developer from Louisville or a government official from 
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Toledo.25 
Interviews were recorded and transcribed, allowing for accurate reproduction of 
their quotes. I first coded the interview data to explore common themes across the 
responses. The same set of initial codes was used for both cities; while many of the codes 
were determined prior to the beginning of field research, questions were allowed to 
evolve and new codes were introduced, both during the study and in the processing of 
data afterword to best represent new insights and information gleaned from study. While 
the interviews were semi-structured, several questions were asked in all interviews 
regardless of the location or participant. One relevant concern for this research would be 
the presence of socially desirable answers; if I asked respondents directly about the effect 
of the stadium I may have produced an inflated perspective of the project’s impact. 
However, I attempted to not ask about the stadium until respondents brought it up 
themselves in discussing the general changes in downtown, and so I was able to query 
both the stadium’s role and its relative importance to other projects. The guiding 
questions I asked across interviews can be found in Appendix D. 
While visiting the cities to conduct interviews, I was also able to observe the 
stadium and experience the neighborhoods I was studying. These observations come from 
multiple visits at different times of the year, both during and outside of the team’s season. 
In addition, I observed the neighborhood on game days and nights, as well as on dates 
and times the team was not playing. The way that the stadium is used by residents and 
visitors at all these points is indicative of its contribution to redevelopment, with the 
 
25 Obviously there is room for overlap between the categories. For instance, a government official could 
easily be a business owner and a citizen of the city. For purposes of the research, I use their position as it 
relates to the way that I identified them as being of interest to the research. 
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anticipation that areas with more uses outside of the team’s season will have been more 
successful. I recorded my field observations nightly and coded them with the same 
categories used to analyze the interview data. 
I also utilize archival data, to corroborate the opinions of residents as well as to 
explore differences between the two cases. The first source of archival data is census 
data, used to identify the spatial impact of the stadium in each city and to provide an 
enhanced understanding of the city’s redevelopment trajectory. I utilize the same census 
data analyzed in Chapter 3 to further evaluate the changes in both cities, as well as more 
recent data from the 2015 American Community Survey to explore changes since the last 
decennial census and better reflect the present standing of the neighborhoods.  
Data from the Census Bureau from the Economic Census is used to study 
employment changes in the area surrounding the stadium. The Economic Census is 
conducted every five years and publishes data on occupation types and earnings for zip 
codes. Zip codes are highly irregular, making its use across a national sample difficult, 
but for case studies it can provide an understanding of what types of businesses entered 
the area surrounding the stadium and with a small sample can be approximated to census 
tracts. 
Finally, newspaper stories and planning documents were also reviewed. These 
sources were primarily used to confirm the reports of respondents and to grasp the timing 
of changes as they occurred over the past fifteen years. However, their availability was 
inconsistent and their data overlaps with what was collected from interviews so they are 
not used as systematically as interview data in the reporting of results. 
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4.2 Case Study of Toledo, Ohio 
4.2.1 Introduction 
Toledo is a blue-collar town located in northwest Ohio, bordering Lake Erie and 
the state of Michigan.26 It was long a manufacturing hub, with important ties to Detroit 
and the automotive industry because of its strategic location for the production of 
complementary products, but also because it was connected directly to St. Louis and New 
York by rail. At its peak, glass was the city’s most prominent industry, which provided 
Toledo its nickname “Glass City” as well as the funding for many of its civic assets and 
downtown architecture. 
When the Fortune 500 list debuted in 1955, the Toledo region hosted six of the 
firms named by the magazine, but the success and vitality of the mid-century has not 
been experienced since. Like other Midwestern cities wedded to a single industry, the 
Toledo region declined during the 1970s and 1980s as a result of industrial restructuring, 
and the city was particularly hard-hit with the relocation of major employers. The period 
of downturn has had a lasting effect on Toledo and their attitudes towards the city. One 
long-time resident reflected, “We [Toledoans] historically have this negative view of 
ourselves. That might stem from a period where we had a bunch of fortune 500 
 
26 From 1835 to 1836, the state of Ohio and the future-state of Michigan fought over the city of Toledo in 
The Toledo War (or the Michigan–Ohio War). The dispute started because of conflicting understandings of 
the geography surrounding the Great Lakes as Michigan applied for statehood. Both states continued to 
claim control over the city and surrounding area, and in order to enforce their claims sent competing 
militias to positions on opposite sides of the nearby Maumee River. The “war” mostly consisted of taunting 
between the two militias, with the only confrontation involving the firing of shots into the air and zero 
casualties. Congress proposed to resolve the stalemate with Michigan receiving the Upper Peninsula in 
exchange for ceding Toledo to Ohio; at the time, the deal was popularly thought to be skewed in Ohio’s 
favor, and Michigan’s voters rejected the proposal. However, that compromise was later imposed by 
President Andrew Jackson, and the subsequent discovery of copper and iron in the Upper Peninsula meant 
the deal may have actually favored Michigan (Faber, 2008) 
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companies that left, and you still find people complaining about that. That happened 35 
years ago!” [Toledo C, resident]. 
What is notable, in conjunction with Toledoans’ sense of negativity, is their 
concern with missed opportunities in the past. For instance, respondents discussed that 
the city was nearly the automotive capital instead of Detroit because it was once 
considered as Henry Ford’s base of operation. That was in addition to a fixation on the 
populations of other cities and the fact that Toledo had a population equal to Atlanta’s as 
recently as 1950 or that “In 1900, Toledo was bigger than Detroit” [Toledo Q, nonprofit] 
(which is incorrect). Perhaps the visions of grandeur emanate from Jessup Wakeman 
Scott, who wrote in 1874 that Toledo would be the “future great city of the world.”27 It 
leaves the city with a strange cocktail of skepticism, visions of grandeur, bitterness, 
decline, and past success that make it difficult for the city to move forward, for every 
plan falls short of their past aspirations. 
Toledo’s central business district followed a trajectory similar to other American 
cities throughout the Rust Belt. As businesses moved out of the city to the Sunbelt or the 
suburbs, residents relocated in turn. While the metropolitan area’s population grew 
slightly after 1970 as shown in Figure 4.1, the city itself declined from 380,000 residents 
in 1970 by nearly a quarter in the 2010 census. The region’s population remained largely 
stable across the 40 years shown, which makes the shift in population starker. While the 
raw numbers themselves speak to the city’s waning, Toledo’s decline is more fully 
captured by its rank among all cities and metropolitan areas in the country. While in 1970 
 
27 This was not a unique position for a land booster like Scott to take; after all, to just take one example, 
Uriah Reavis published Saint Louis – The Future Great City of the World in 1875. However, these views 
appear to have filtered into the collective milieu of the city, though mixed with recent failures. 
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Toledo was the 36th largest city and the 54th largest metro in the country, it had fallen to 
66th and 84th by 2010.28 Similarly, Figure 4.2 shows Toledo’s housing prices stagnating, 
particularly as they lag further behind the nation between 2000 and 2010. In addition, the 
metro and city median home prices were far closer in 1970 than 2010, displaying that the 
relative value of living in the city fell relative to the suburbs. 
 
Figure 4.1 Toledo, Oh: Population (and National Rank) 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Toledo, OH: Median Home Values 
 
28 Had the city’s population remained the same through all forty years, the metro still would have lost 
ground in the national rankings, falling from 54th, to 60th, 61st, 69th, and 73rd with each subsequent census.  
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During the 1980s and 1990s Toledo’s government and private investors made 
efforts to redevelop downtown and prevent further population losses. The most 
significant initiative was the Portside Festival Marketplace, which opened in 1984 as the 
“crowning jewel of Toledo’s new downtown” (Yonke, 2015). Portside connected the past 
and future for Toledo as it was situated on the former site of Tiedke’s, a landmark retail 
store that had opened in downtown Toledo at the turn of the 20th century until the loss of 
downtown residents and growth of suburban shopping forced its closure. Portside was 
intended as more than a mall, featuring event space, upscale shops, and restaurants, but 
ultimately was unable to stem the losses to the suburbs and closed completely after only 6 
years. One long-time resident remembered it with a sense of melancholy: 
We had wonderful shops. There was even a great Brooklyn fish market over 
there. At noon you don't buy fish and put it in your desk drawer until 5:00 
at night and go home. That was one of the first shops to close… Everything 
was going great. We had tenants coming into the building and then Portside 
closed. That was just like a faucet getting turned off. The whole downtown 
kind of stagnated at that point. Not completely, but Portside was a big 
attraction and when it closed it really did leave a void plus the fact that there 
was a huge buildup [Toledo P, nonprofit]. 
 
The decline of Portside harmed downtown Toledo, but it was part of a 
broader trend of despair and pessimism for the city. In particular, the savings and 
loan crises in the 1980s severely affected the city’s prospects of putting additional 
investments in alongside Portside:  
Toledo in the 1990's had suffered a major Metropolitan scandal in the 80's 
when credit unions failed and you'll have to check the number, but I think 
there was some $70 million in downtown Toledo development that tanked. 
[Toledo I, resident]. 
 
These failures have had a continued effect on the city, particularly as the Great 
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Recession set in:  
"We felt we were taken under the chin for a while, we could not bank on 
things that we didn’t have any power to control. Because it was the 
savings and loan debacle in the 80s that put us back on our heels again. 
Then it was the mortgage debt and so forth with the banks …We didn’t 
really have that many underwater houses because our mortgages are not 
that high here, but we were getting hurt bad and it was not from things that 
we had any control of" [Toledo H, government]. 
 
The loss of retail and closing of Portside does not mean that Toledo as a city does 
not possess anchors or attractions. However, they are not positioned centrally enough to 
stabilize downtown. For example, Toledo has the top-rated zoo in the United States 
according to USA Today’s 10 Best Readers’ Choice Contest,29 but it is located roughly 
three miles from downtown. The University of Toledo is a Tier 2 national university with 
a total enrollment of roughly 20,000, which could add vitality and activity to the central 
business district, but it is located about 4 miles away. The city’s century-old art museum, 
created with an endowment from leading glass industrialist Edward Libbey, remains free 
to the public but it is located roughly two miles from the central business district and on 
the fringes of downtown. While other arts venues, like the opera and performing arts, are 
still located downtown the city’s strongest assets add to the dispersal of the region. 
The lack of entertainment options was reflected in my interviews, particularly 
with young adults who grew up in Toledo during the 1980s and 90s.30 Despite the 
attempts at investments in projects like Portside, downtown was not a place that people 
came:  
 
29 This is not meant to be taken as a rigorous ranking of the zoos, but it does provide some insight towards 
its standing in the country.  http://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/destinations/2014/05/21/10best-readers-
choice-best-us-zoo-winners-announced/9331483/ 
30 John Denver wrote a song after spending a Saturday night in Toledo, Ohio during the early 1970’s titled 
appropriately enough “Saturday Night in Toledo, Ohio” It begins “Saturday night in Toledo, Ohio is like 
being nowhere at all.” 
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When I was in high school when you came downtown you really just 
came downtown to basically cut through to go to our sports arena which 
was on the other side of the river. There really wasn’t another reason. If 
you didn’t work down here there wasn’t a lot of reason to come down, 
maybe something at the Seagate Center occasionally. Where the stadium 
is located now was actually mostly strip clubs [Toledo G, government]. 
 
 Or as Toledo B, who grew up in the region and returned after college to 
raise a family, described it: "when I was growing up you didn't go downtown for 
anything. People went downtown only if this is where you worked. There was 
nothing to do. There were not activities. Everything was abandoned around here. 
Unless you worked here, you literally had no reason to go downtown." It was not 
just safety concerns that kept people away, it was a distinct lack of choices in 
amenities: It's not that I didn't feel safe. I just didn't like to do it. There just wasn't 
anything to come down here for other than to go out at night and that was it. 
There weren't a lot of restaurants here… Growing up, we never came downtown” 
[Toledo N, government]. 
Toledo’s downtown and the city face many burdens, some that are 
psychological and others that are practical. One burden of the city is its own 
legacy, which makes its continued decline even starker in comparison to the 
heights it once reached and for which it still pines. Another burden is past failures. 
The loss of major employers, the downfall of Portside, and the savings and loan 
crises left a heavy pessimism in the city. Further, the savings and loan crises dried 
up funding for redevelopment for over a decade. With Portside’s failure and a 
lack of money to invest in other projects, individuals did not have a frame of 
reference for coming downtown. There was also a lack of faith in government 
officials throughout the interviews; as long-time resident Toledo I complained, 
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“the city has a history of its leaders putting themselves before the community and 
being scoundrels and padding their own individual or corporate accounts more 
than certain public interest.” Or, as Toledo T said, “Getting any positive response 
out of city hall is near impossible… they owe everything to the unions, which 
slows everything down.” 
The built environment was a large obstacle to successful redevelopment as 
well. Thirty-five percent of downtown Toledo is currently parking lots31 and of 
the commercial real estate, estimates for the vacancy rates in the 2000s were 
around thirty percent (Deeter, Shetty & Reid, 2015). Individuals or consortiums 
that live or are based outside Toledo, who own many of the vacant properties, 
have not been motivated to either maintain or sell their properties:  
"A big problem we have is bad property owners, and they're bad property 
owners for a number of reasons. Choose your factors. They inherited the 
property, they're not from here, they have plenty of other properties in 
their portfolio that are worth way more so they don't really care about this 
one, or they're making passive income on them already that covers their 
costs” [Toledo C, resident].  
 
The local government has limited means to take over the properties as the owners 
wait for offers that match their expectations: “The county and city have tried to 
take those buildings on multiple occasions because they won’t pay their property 
taxes. When they get to a certain point and they take them to court to try and 
overtake they miraculously come up with hundreds of thousands of dollars to pay 
for the taxes" [Toledo G, government]. The second tallest building in the city, the 
 
31 I estimated the percentage of downtown Toledo’s surface area that is parking lots manually. I collected a 
map of parking provided by the city, and estimated the amount of space that was covered by parking lots 
and garages.  
 
 80 
 
Fiberglass Tower, matches this description as it is owned by an individual from 
Grand Rapids, Michigan and has sat vacant since 1998 until a recent effort to 
redevelop it began (Victor, 2016). Toledo has a large downtown built to 
accommodate a booming industrial city, which modernly leaves vast swathes of 
the city empty and lifeless space. The enormity of the problem led Toledo to 
believe that it needed a large project to revitalize its downtown 
4.2.2 Overview of Neighborhoods Prior to Stadium Opening 
The treatment area in Toledo included five census tracts that comprise parts of 
four neighborhoods (see Figure 4.3 below). Tract 28 covers the central business district 
for Toledo, though it also includes parts of the adjacent neighborhood of Uptown. The 
remainder of Uptown is in Tract 27. Tracts 37 and 34 comprise what is known as the 
Warehouse District, where the stadium is physically located. Finally, tract 29 is located in 
North River, which is part of the urban core but lays at the periphery of downtown.  
 
 
Figure 4.3. Toledo Treatment Area 
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Table 4.1. Description of Tracts Treated in Toledo 
Tract Neighborhood Description 
27 Central Business 
District/Uptown 
Mix of residential and commercial space 
28 Central Business District Mix of residential and commercial space, 
employment center for the city 
29 North River Primarily residential housing 
34 Warehouse District Mix of residential and commercial space 
37 Warehouse District Mix of residential and commercial space 
 
The central business district was the traditional center of employment and retail in 
the first half of the 20th century, and still bears many historical structures and landmarks, 
though many were torn down between the city’s best years and today. The Uptown 
neighborhood grew as a residential area while downtown was expanding early in the 
century, though it also encompasses large sections of commercial property as well. The 
warehouse district, where the stadium is located, houses little of the city’s history, as it 
transitioned from an industrial area with numerous warehouses, into underdeveloped 
commercial spaces:  
The interesting thing about the Warehouse District is it never, it was 
always a blank slate because it was very literally a warehouse district. It 
was never a residential neighborhood, it was just storage and shipping. 
You have all these big empty buildings that were ripe for galleries or loft 
apartments [Toledo A, nonprofit]. 
 
 
Table 4.2. Pre-Treatment Status of Toledo Tracts (percentiles in parenthesis) 
Rent Income Housing Population Vacancy 
$489 (19th) $16,680 (6th) 600 (4th) 530 (1st) 33% (100th) 
$456 (43rd) $15,373 (4th) 596 (3rd) 1,145 (3rd) 18% (96th) 
$197 (3rd) $11,716 (1st) 1,348 (48th) 2,240 (20th) 13% (76th) 
$228 (4th) $15,823 (5th) 363 (2nd) 770 (2nd) 14% (79th) 
$184 (2nd) $12,875 (3rd) 706 (7th) 1,500 (4th) 4% (23rd) 
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The census data shown in Table 4.3 supports the description of the Warehouse 
District as “a blank slate” prior to the stadium’s arrival. All five tracts were in the lowest 
percentiles for the number of housing units, income, and population in the city. Two 
tracts, 28 and 27, show some separation in terms of their median rent, but are still beneath 
the 50th percentile for the city. The higher median rents in those tracts  may also help to 
explain why they have the highest and fourth highest vacancy rates in the city. Taken that 
these tracts comprise a large swath of central Toledo, one can appreciate the concern of 
city officials and the view that urban redevelopment was necessary. 
4.2.3 After the Stadium Opened 
In 2002 Toledo opened Fifth-Third Field to host the Toledo Mud Hens.32 The 
stadium cost $52.29 million (in 2016 dollars) to open and was financed primarily by the 
team and Lucas County; the county retained ownership of the facility, and have a lease 
with the team. The Mud Hens has remained popular locally, with attendance over 
500,000 every year the since opening. In fact, the team has only fallen short of their 
attendance from the stadiums opening season (547,204) in one season (2003).33 In 2015, 
the Toledo Mud Hens finished seventh out of twelve in attendance for the International 
league, despite having the smallest stadium capacity in the league. 
Fifth-Third Field had not successfully redeveloped the five tracts lying within one 
mile one decade later according to the census data shown in Table 4.3. Three of the tracts 
saw declines in their median rents and four saw decreases in their median incomes. By 
 
32 The team has national notoriety because of the television show MASH. Jaime Farr, who played Maxwell 
Q. Klinger, was a native of Toledo and he would often wear Mud Hens hats and jerseys on the show. 
Because of that historically oddity, Toledo has one of the best known mascots in the country. 
33 Attendance figures provided by the team 
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2010, new housing construction had not begun consistently as in three cases the housing 
stock had decreased. There were substantial decreases in the vacancy rate for two tracts, 
but in three others, they rose. Tract 28, which covers the central business district, saw the 
largest sign of redevelopment and had positive results in all categories except vacancy 
rates. 
 
Table 4.3 Percent Changes in Treated Tracts since 2000 
Neighborhood 
% Change 
Median Rent 
% Change 
Median 
Income 
% Change 
in Housing 
% Change 
in 
Population 
Change in 
% Vacant 
CBD/Uptown 13.8% -6.5% -2.3% 31.7% -15.8% 
CBD 9.7% 44.9% 19.1% 21.7% 4.2% 
North River -13.4% -43.7% -14.5% -32.3% 9.5% 
Warehouse  -6.5% -39.2% -3.6% -7.0% -14.0% 
Warehouse -1.4% -36.9% 6.2% -1.7% 1.4% 
 
Despite what the Census data indicates, there was a broad consensus across 
participants that the stadium had contributed positively to redevelopment in Toledo, 
particularly in the Warehouse District. A government official described the stadium as 
“having brought people back downtown" [Toledo N]. The stadium was important even 
though "The [Mud Hens] is an event that happens for 4 months of the year…” all year 
long “You've got an anchor there to build off of and work with" [Toledo O, nonprofit]. 
One long-time resident of the Warehouse District described the redevelopment of the 
neighborhood as being “very slow, very slow, very slow until the Mud Hens came down. 
That announcement was turning the faucet back on… They've been a catalyst. There's no 
getting around them" [Toledo P, nonprofit]. Or as one participant described the change: 
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“It took a while. There were lots of theories about what was going to happen. And 
skepticism about what was going to happen and it was slow coming. I tell people all the 
time I think that is what has made the warehouse district successful” [Toledo R, 
government]. 
Much of the credit for the increased positivity towards downtown’s future is 
directed towards Fifth-Third Field: “A lot of this stuff would not be happening. There's 
no doubt that the Mud Hens have been a significant driver. We wouldn't be where we are 
if it wasn't for them" [Toledo A, nonprofit] or that "Fifth Third Field sparked the catalyst 
of change down here. The number of businesses, I think there were two. Now, there's 
twenty-five to thirty within a two-block radius of the ballpark that have opened up in the 
last fifteen years" [Toledo B, business].  
The difference in opinions between residents and the census data may be 
explained the fact that the Census data reviewed is from 7 years ago while I am speaking 
to residents and observing the neighborhoods at present. On that point, one resident 
expressed that, "My personal opinion is that the Mud Hen stadium has had a tremendous 
impact on downtown's renaissance, but it's really not taken hold until the culture and the 
momentum was there to really appreciate that benefit. It's only been the last 5 years 
[emphasis added], really, that's dramatically changed the Warehouse District.” [Toledo 
R, government]. However, they went on to say:  
Whether that was a direct cause and effect or whether it was just part of 
being at the right place at the right time to now start building on those 
influences. The millennials want to be downtown. They care more about 
transportation and not about cars. They want some sort of sense of 
community like you're talking about. I don't know whether the Mud Hens 
caused that. Maybe. A little bit certainly. There are 500,000 people that 
come downtown that didn't come downtown before. They experienced it. 
They felt something different. They had a sense of pride. 
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However, even a longer time horizon than was used for Chapter 3 does not 
produce a picture of urban redevelopment in downtown Toledo. Much of the 
perceived change in the Warehouse District is simply not borne out in the data 
shown in Table 4.4. 
 
Table 4.4 Changes in Downtown Toledo 2000 to 2015 
 
Median Rent 
% Change 
Median Income % 
Change 
Housing 
% Change 
Population 
% Change 
Vacancy Rate 
% Change 
27 -9.8% -46.8% -2.7% 99.1% -87.9% 
28 -14.7% -42.3% 32.0% 33.6% -22.2% 
29 -23.9% -24.3% -13.5% -28.4% 53.8% 
34 -17.1% -43.9% 6.1% 18.3% -28.6% 
37 56.0% -31.1% -6.4% -17.5% 300.0% 
 
According to attendance figures, residents are correct that the ballpark has been 
bringing hundreds of thousands of visitors to the area, many of which otherwise would 
not have been there, adding activity that is hard to dismiss. However, such activity may 
simply have not had the durable effects on the neighborhoods status that they perceive. 
As one (failed) business owner in the area explained, “there was, probably, a spike of 
activity and interest and excitement, right when we opened and then it puttered out for a 
few years… We thought that the neighborhood could sustain [our business]. We were 
wrong, but, yeah, that's what. I think, there just weren't enough people there yet” [Toledo 
M]. 
 Thus, the perception of success may be more mental than physical. One 
respondent questioned the physical impact of the stadium to that point, but conceded that, 
"What it does is create... good will in the community" [Toledo O, nonprofit]. For a city 
with negative perceptions of itself, good will can be valuable. They went on: "Baseball 
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stadiums are a lot more than just the development, they're about the community, belief, 
and things like that" [Toledo O, nonprofit]. Another government official [Toledo R, 
government] said they "think downtown's on the verge, like I said before, I think we're on 
the verge to do some really great things and I think the Mud Hen stadium was a key piece 
of that. Very key piece of that. For them to have the foresight or the political will or 
whatever to achieve that was terrific." The building of the stadium “legitimizes things 
that go on down here” because even for people that don’t attend the games the fact that 
“the baseball team chose to be here so it makes them say, ‘Well I think downtown is a 
waste and I think it's going to fail but they must see something in it’" [Toledo F, 
developer]. 
It is not simply the perception of the resident’s that within a few blocks of the 
stadium there are more businesses open now than there were when the stadium opened. 
Economic Census data shows elements of the changes in downtown Toledo that residents 
noticed and were apparent while observing the city. Figure 4.4 shows how Fifth-Third 
Field’s zip code approximates to the five treated tracts while Table 4.5 displays the 
change in establishments for the area in two broad categories: Accommodation and food 
services, as well as Arts, entertainment, and recreation.  
 
 Table 4.5 Economic Census Data for Toledo 
Category 2002 2007 2012 
Change 
2002-12 
Arts, entertainment, and recreation 6 9 9 50.0% 
Accommodation and food services 38 67 59 55.3% 
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Figure 4.4 Treatment Tracts to Zip Code 43604 
 
Between 2002 and 2012, there were increases in both categories with the number 
of restaurants showing more substantial growth. While the stadium has not had the broad 
effect on redevelopment expected, the increase in activity is a positive sign that is 
visceral and immediately apparent to residents. And from observation, the growth in 
restaurants is highly clustered within the area immediately surrounding the stadium. 
Toledo’s stadium deserves credit for the growth of restaurants and shops within those few 
blocks because without the stadium, there would be no reason for that type of cluster to 
form. 
In addition, Fifth-Third Field has directly led to more recent ancillary 
developments in the area. In the summer of 2016, the Toledo Mud Hens opened 
Hensville, a set of restaurants and event space opened in a block of vacant buildings 
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across the street from the stadium.34 The location of Fifth-Third Field also played a large 
role in the placement of the Huntington Center, which together have given the area year 
round activity.  
It should be noted that Toledo’s stadium has been relatively successful 
financially. While many cities have been trapped paying off bonds for stadiums of teams 
that have since departed, the bonds for Fifth-Third Field were paid off 5 years early and 
saved the county over $5 million in payments. The bonds were paid off with receipts 
from the stadium, including naming rights and ticket sales, which had been higher than 
initially projected (Reiter, 2016).  
While there are minimal signs of redevelopment around the stadium in Toledo, it 
has not had an influence throughout the area defined as treated. As Toledo F [developer] 
described the problems: “Toledo's always had a problem of momentum, I would say, this 
time being a baseball stadium. If you don't have a long-term momentum plan, and if I 
was a public planner, we've got to look at what we want to develop and come up with a 
strategy.” Both the lack of planning and inability to marshal change led to a nine year gap 
for the development of a second anchor amenity in the area. While the stadium has 
brought visitors to the area and has led to marks of development, the stadium alone has 
not been a large enough driver of change to transform Toledo’s downtown.  
 
34 In fact, the management of the Toledo Mud Hens have remained highly involved in the development of 
the neighborhood. Every team gives out a game day publication, which provides a list of players, 
information about promotions happening during the season, and ad space for sponsors. However, the cover 
of the Mud Hens program for the 2017 season features not their stadium or a player, but rather their 
Hensville buildings. The pages read almost as an urban development advertisement, with long sections on 
the project, explaining that “the whole intention of the Hensville project is to ensure the continued revival 
of Toledo’s downtown” (The Muddy Times 2016, page 38). Not many American professional sports teams 
are operated as nonprofits, and fewer carry on the extra burden of acting as an urban redeveloper around the 
stadium. 
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4.3 Case Study of Louisville, Kentucky  
4.3.1 Introduction.  
Louisville, Kentucky’s ethos is a mix of Southern hospitality, Northeastern 
business, and Midwestern humility, owing to their site at the crossroads of America’s 
cultures. One of the oldest cities west of the Appalachian Mountains, early decades saw 
slow growth until the advent of the steamboat and a boom in industrial development and 
shipping. Their setting on one of the largest and oldest inland ports in the country 
combined with their central location has always made Louisville a center of shipping and 
cargo,35 which continues today as they are the base of operations for United Parcel 
Service (UPS). The city is perhaps best known for hosting the Kentucky Derby, which 
each year draws hundreds of thousands of visitors into the city for the mile and one-
quarter thoroughbred race as well as the two weeks’ of events leading up to the race 
itself.36 
 Louisville has hosted more than its fair share of national characters, including 
Colonel Sanders, Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, and Muhammed Ali, and the 
city makes efforts to celebrate them all throughout their downtown. For a city as large as 
Louisville, a large proportion of current residents have either lived in the region their 
entire life or ‘boomeranged’ after college: “It's interesting that there's a common thing in 
Louisville, it's weird when you first come here it's like everybody wants to know where 
you went to high school. When they say where'd you go to school they mean high school, 
 
35 One of those early cargos that contributed to the city’s early growth was slaves, and the phrase ‘sold 
down the river’ originated in reference to slave families being divided and shipped out of Louisville 
literally down the river. Inscoe, J. C. (Ed.). (2001). Appalachians and race: The mountain south from 
slavery to segregation. University Press of Kentucky. 
36 Popularly known as the Run for the Roses, the Derby is also often referred to as the ‘Two Most Exciting 
Minutes in Sports.’ 
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they don't mean college” [Louisville D, nonprofit]. Despite their Southern location and 
the rootedness of residents, respondents argued that Louisville “has always been 
progressive,” and more specifically, that “We were the first southern city to have LGBT 
rights ordinance” [Louisville H, nonprofit]. 
Despite Louisville’s openness to outsiders and ability to retain their own 
residents, the city went through a similar hollowing out as other industrial cities. 
However, the metropolitan area never saw the same level of decline in population as the 
city, as shown in Figure 4.5. 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Louisville, KY: Population (and National Rank) 
 
Louisville’s metropolitan area grew across the 40 years observed, but it did not 
increase its place in the country, as it ranked 39th in 1970 and 43rd in 2010. The national 
ranking of the city population matched that of the metropolitan area in 1970, but declined 
steadily until the end of the century despite barely losing population numerically during 
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that time. After falling to 63rd nationally in 2000, the merger of the city’s and Jefferson 
County’s government explains the sudden growth of the population at the start of the 21st 
century. The merger was motivated in part by the declining population of Louisville’s 
city, and while it succeeded in that regard, the evidence is inconsistent on whether it 
improved service delivery or economic growth (Carr, Bae & Lu, 2006).  
The merger of the city and county government, “the only large city in a 
generation that's merged its city and county,” [Louisville C, business] was led by Mayor 
Jerry Abramson, who residents used to call “mayor for life because he ran so many 
terms” [Louisville J, government]. When Jerry Abramson won election as the Lieutenant 
Governor in 2012, the new mayor, “Greg Fisher … has a very similar vision in terms of 
the importance of the urban core” [Louisville J, government]. Thus, with a pronounced 
quantity of long-time residents and only three mayors in the last thirty years37, there is a 
great sense of continuity of policy and direction for the city.  
Despite the fluctuations in the distribution of the population, the housing market 
for Louisville has remained stable for both the metro and city. While they have 
consistently lagged the national housing market, the city and metro have remained similar 
throughout the past forty years. In addition, both the city and the metro’s housing market 
saw growth in the decade between 1990 and 2000, indicating that the region had already 
begun to recover from its earlier regional decline. 
 
 
37 Jerry Abramson (1986-1999); David Armstrong (1999-2003); Jerry Abramson (2003-2011); Greg Fisher 
(2011-) 
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Figure 4.6 Louisville, KY: Median Home Values 
 
There was an added racial element to the decline of Louisville as a riot in 1968 in 
the city’s downtown accelerated change. While the city and metro were similar in their 
shares of African-Americans in 1970, a difference of only 5 percent, the divergence grew 
over time until the government merger as shown in Figure 4.7.  
 
 
Figure 4.7 Percentage of African-Americans in Louisville 
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At present, by some measures, Louisville remains among the most segregated 
cities in the country, and such racial disparities create increased inequalities and barriers 
to invigorating decaying neighborhoods (Glaeser & Vigdor, 2000). As Figure 4.8 shows, 
African-Americans were heavily concentrated in central Louisville in the 2000 census, 
particularly on the West side of the city where they account for over 90% of residents. On 
the East side of the city, where the stadium was located, the racial composition is 
somewhat more diverse, but African-Americans still accounted for a majority of residents 
in 2000.  
 
 
Figure 4.8 Percentage African-American by Tract in Louisville 2000 
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4.3.2 Overview of Neighborhoods Prior to Stadium Opening 
Two tracts38 in Louisville fall within one mile of Louisville Slugger Field, as 
shown in Figure 4.9.  
 
Figure 4.9 Louisville Treatment Tracts 
 
Tract 49 encompasses the traditional downtown of the city, which during the 
1990’s retained a large share of the city’s employment and several cultural attractions, 
but struggled to offer retail or dining in the evening. For instance, Tract 49 holds Actors 
Theatre, the winner of numerous regional theatre awards, and the Kentucky Center for 
the Arts which houses the opera, ballet, and orchestra. In addition, the Louisville Slugger 
Bat Museum opened in 1996 on West Main Street and has proven to be a successful 
attraction. However, despite the arts and a core of employment, which included the 
Humana headquarters that opened in the 1980s, there was “no activity after five o'clock 
 
38 The two treated tracts in Louisville are actually larger in terms of total land area than the five in Toledo 
(2.21 vs.1.74). Thus, while the number of observations for different projects can be quite different, the 
actual size of the treated area is fairly consistent. However, with fewer observations there is a less refined 
view of the shape of changes observed in Louisville. 
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…. Very few restaurants that really served any kind of nightlife here” [Louisville D, 
nonprofit]. As Louisville K described the city: “Louisville had a pretty strong central 
office market. Our office was strong, our residential was nil, our retail was in the toilet, 
so you could bowl on the streets at 5 o'clock. 5:15, maybe” because "the city was a place 
where people went to work, then they got in their car and they went home" [Louisville F, 
developer]. 
Early efforts to revitalize Louisville’s downtown failed. One of the first and 
longest such efforts concerns Fourth Street in Louisville. Long a center of theaters and 
shopping, three blocks on Fourth Street were converted into a car-free shopping center 
called the River City Mall as part of an effort to stabilize downtown retail. However, the 
River City Mall quickly closed, and in the 1980s the Galleria was opened on the same 
site. The Galleria, opened with partial public financing, strove to imitate a suburban mall 
in an urban location39 but, like River City Mall, was unsuccessful. 
There were also attempts to invigorate the downtown housing market in the late 
1980s, particularly with a project known as the Crescent. While the project used local 
funds including union pensions, the major lender was Manufacturers Hanover out of New 
York. Further, the management and expertise were external to Louisville and when the 
project failed it "absolutely made every local financial institution leery of downtown 
housing" [Louisville F, developer] and prevented any similar projects for a decade. 
However, Louisville was able to preserve much of its historical building stock 
 
39 "...the thing that we had missed in urban redevelopment is we, at first, tried to do urban redevelopment 
by making suburban garden style apartments or suburban malls downtown. We called them urban malls. 
Why would people in the suburbs come to an urban mall when all they had to do was go to their own little 
mall that was in their backyard and had free parking?" -Louisville F 
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despite its decline: “when a lot of other cities were tearing down buildings in the '60s, 
'70s, '80s, Louisville did not. We didn't have money. There were not developers out there 
looking for the land, so nobody was tearing down the buildings. … we lost some 
buildings, but we have such a huge collection of original architecture" [Louisville B, 
government]. Currently, downtown Louisville holds 84 buildings on the National 
Register of Historical Places, many of which have been redeveloped into modern 
attractions. 
The second treated tract in Louisville can generally be described as the East 
Market District, and combines parts of Butchertown, Phoenix Hill, and NuLu. NuLu (a 
relatively recently coined portmanteau of New and Louisville) is a neighborhood that 
developed shortly before the stadium. Butchertown and Phoenix Hill are historically 
residential areas, while NuLu hosts a cluster of art galleries and restaurants. Tract 59 is 
separated from downtown by I-65, which can be crossed under by foot.  
While downtown Louisville is defined by its past as the center of employment and 
its copious historical architecture that remains, the East Market District was long 
distinguished primarily by a homeless mission that prevented the development of retail or 
the improvement of the housing stock. As one long-time business owner in the East 
Market District explained: “there was a homeless shelter about two blocks down from us, 
a couple galleries, Joe Lay's antiques, but that was kind of it … I kept the door locked 
when I was in the office by myself, you know. If that's like an indication of what it was 
like” [Louisville K]. 
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Table 4.5 Pre-Treatment Status of Louisville Tracts (percentiles in parenthesis) 
Tract Rent Income Housing Population Vacancy 
59 $233 (3rd) $11,862 (2nd) 2,674 (95th) 5,072 (83rd) 7% (68th) 
49 $359 (5th) $15,546 (3rd) 1,564 (51st) 2,553 (23rd) 20% (100th) 
 
The two tracts that were treated by Slugger Field were blighted in 2000, though 
not undeveloped. As shown in table 4.5, both tracts had extremely low rents and median 
incomes relative to the rest of the city in 2000. However, tract 59 has a history as a 
residential area with over 2600 units, and a high population as well. While tract 49 in 
downtown was less built-up in 2000, it is over the 50th percentile in terms of housing, 
though it ranks in the lowest quartile of the city in terms of population. The large gap 
between the count of housing and population helps to explain why it had the highest 
vacancy rate in the city of Louisville at 20%.  
4.3.3 After the Stadium Opened 
Louisville’s Slugger Field, which hosts the Louisville Bats40, was built in 2000 at 
a total cost of $51 million (in 2015 dollars). In the first decade after opening the team 
annually attracted over 600,000 visitors, but in the last few years those figures have fallen 
to the mid-500 thousands; in 2015, they ranked eighth41 out of the fourteen teams playing 
in the International League. The stadium itself is situated adjacent to Waterfront Park and 
the Ohio River, but also has overpasses from I-65 visible from behind home plate. The 
stadium is located on the site of a former train yard, which had modernly been turned into 
a scrapyard; the stadium preserves parts of the freight year built in 1895 for event space 
 
40 Their mascot is the animal, but the illusion is to the piece of baseball equipment. The team is thus tied to 
the Louisville Slugger baseball bat in multiple ways, as the corporation purchased lifetime naming rights to 
the stadium. 
41 One spot and roughly four-thousand fans behind the Toledo Mud Hens. 
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and the team’s offices, which draws comparison to Camden yard in Baltimore.  
Both treated tracts in downtown Louisville saw substantial redevelopment 
between 2000 and 2010 as shown in Table 4.6. Median rents increased in both downtown 
(13.8 percent) and the East Market District (25.7 percent). In addition, median incomes 
increased even more, with both seeing jumps of over 30 percent.  
Table 4.6 Change in Treated Louisville from 2000 to 2010 
Neighborhood 
% Change 
Median 
Rent 
% Change 
Median 
Income 
% Change in 
Housing 
% Change in 
Population 
% Change in 
Vacancy 
Downtown 25.7% 40.2% 25.8% 55.2% 5.0% 
East Market 13.8% 30.2% -13.1% -25.0% 7.8% 
 
However, the two tracts saw different changes in their housing stocks and 
populations. The East Market District saw a substantial increase in both housing and 
population, by 25.8 and 55.2 percent respectively, while downtown saw decreases in both 
by about half of its counterpart. Part of that decrease possibly relates to intentional 
actions of the government to do away with concentrated low-income housing and 
attempts to construct mixed-income housing using HOPE VI funding. This may have 
“really helped the city to develop a more hospitable downtown feel” [Louisville H, 
nonprofit] but also meant a decrease in the total housing available. Oddly, considering the 
opposing directions that the housing stock went in both tracts, there were increases in the 
vacancy rates in both tracts, which is difficult to attribute to any single cause.  
Residents have noticed the changes to downtown, noting that “particularly the 
food and dining, eating and drinking scene, it's just extremely vibrant and the city as a 
whole but especially downtown ... People will vacation in Louisville just to go eat and 
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drink for a week" [Louisville E, resident]. That view is borne out by data from the 
Economic Census (Table 4.7), which shows substantial growth in the amount of 
entertainment and food services in the area. Both categories grew over the decade by 
about one-third, although the number of arts, entertainment, and recreation 
establishments declined between 2007 and 2012. 
 
 
Figure 4.10 Treatment Tracts to Zip Code 40202 
 
Table 4.7 Economic Census Data for Louisville 
Category 2002 2007 2012 
Change 2012-
2002 
Arts, entertainment, and recreation 24 36 32 33.3% 
Accommodation and food services 111 132 147 32.4% 
 
In addition to the dining scene, there’s been a change in population density 
downtown: “There's definitely more people living downtown as opposed to just working 
and then getting out at four or five, so I think it's become a much more lively place and 
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more nightlife offerings definitely made it a safer place. People don't fear to walk from 
bar to bar as much downtown anymore” [Louisville K, business]. One respondent, who 
lives in the suburbs but works downtown, mentioned that the largest change has been the 
perception. Louisville A [government] explained that friends used to say “‘It's not safe. I 
would get lost. I don't know my way around,’” but now because of “the opportunities to 
come down here: the entertainment, the food” that “the perception has changed 
significantly,” all of which “start[ed] with Slugger Field being built.” 
Slugger Field was given broad credit for the changes to downtown by respondents 
because it was an early piece that preceded the renaissance. As Louisville J [government] 
said, "The baseball stadium was kind of the real key to turning this side of downtown into 
a hospitable, likable, friendly place." Or in the very similar words of Louisville G 
[developer]: “I think the Bats stadium was really one of the keys to revitalizing the 
general downtown area and making it seem friendly and approachable and kid friendly 
and family friendly.” 
The effects were felt in both downtown as well as the East Market District: “After 
Slugger Field opened everyone was like, ‘Well East Main and Market is a gorgeous area, 
what could we do there?’ All of a sudden those buildings started getting façade 
improvements and businesses started moving in" [Louisville B, government]. 
A portion of that success was attributed to its specific location. Replacing a 
scrapyard was mentioned by several respondents as part of the importance of the project: 
"Well, I mean certainly it was a very big barrier before. It was really just a blight, right? 
It was scrapyard. Removing the blight helps, always helps, but I think that having it there 
and having it look so great helped" [Louisville I, government]. Government official 
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Louisville G said, “I think that was probably a really smart place to put a publicly 
subsidized property because of the brown field issues” and “because it was such a brown 
field I just don't know what other use. I don't think there was a private sector use really 
for that property.” Or as Louisville F [developer] stated, “Without Slugger, they had no 
way to get the scrap metal yard mitigated. That was the big battle that was going on…By 
building it there, it's created some economic development in that area that resulted in the 
silver building with the sloped roof, it resulted in the Fleur-de-lis building.” 
However, one telling feature of Louisville’s redevelopment is the number of times 
that the respondents mention the stadium in conjunction with other projects:  
"The thing about Slugger that is really different, at least from my 
perspective, than some other things where you build some sort of sports 
facility and then there's nothing else that happens, Slugger happened along 
with so many other projects around there [emphasis added] that it really 
helped I think make that project so impactful to the park and the housing, 
and really making that part of downtown have different uses kind of all at 
once" [Louisville I, government].  
 
The Waterfront Park, which was built adjacent to Slugger Field and opened two years 
earlier, was mentioned several times: "I don't think there's any question that, Waterfront 
Park and Slugger Field would have been part of a synergy. That they were related" 
[Louisville O, resident]. Or as Louisville F explained: “You put the ballpark down there, 
you get some restaurants. Then we furthered it by building the Yum! Center because, at 
that point, you've got a balance between ... All that happened downtown that was keeping 
it alive for anything other than business was the arts, and the arts venues primarily are 
activated during the winter.” 
Thus, as Louisville L [government] concluded, "the redevelopment around 
Slugger was the result of some very deliberate decisions, right? It wasn't like Slugger got 
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built without the sense that the stuff around it was important. You have to kind of cluster 
things. I think that it was not a mistake that that project had a positive impact, because it 
was very deliberately intended to have a positive impact. It wasn't like they built it and 
didn't understand that the other stuff needed to happen." While credit was certainly given 
to the stadium for playing a role in the redevelopment, a common sentiment was that  
It was a number of things, really. I think that having Museum Row with 
the bat factory coming, and having the constant addition of new things on 
West Main Street was really key. West Main Street just feels great. It has 
such a great scale to it, so people really like that. I think that Slugger Field 
and Waterfront Park ... They were really important to each other, and I 
think that that is absolutely the case [Louisville I, government]. 
 
The number of projects opened at the same time or shortly after Slugger Field is 
dizzying. In downtown Louisville, Waterfront Park opened in 1998 and one year later the 
Convention Center began a $72 million dollar renovation adding over 400,000 square 
feet of floor space. Museum Row, which is a cluster of ten major museums,42 opened in 
2004 and runs along Main Street. Those are in addition to the already present Actors 
Theatre and the Galt House. In 2010, the KFC Yum! Center, which hosts concerts as well 
as the University of Louisville Basketball games, opened on Main Street between 
Museum Row and Slugger Field. This flurry of activity makes it impossible using 
decennial census data to pinpoint how much of Louisville’s redevelopment should be 
attributed to Slugger Field, but it highlights the importance of having other amenities 
ready for investment. 
No matter how deliberate the decisions were, Slugger Field was not directly 
 
42 Museum Row includes the Frazier History Museum, Glassworks, Louisville Slugger Museum and 
Factory, Kentucky Science Center, KentuckyShow!, Kentucky Museum of Art and Craft, 21c Museum 
Hotel, the Muhammad Ali Center, The Kentucky Center for the Performing Arts, and the Evan Williams 
Bourbon Experience. 
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involved in those secondary projects despite contributing to making the surrounding area 
more attractive to investment. Therefore, to credit the stadium with all changes in the area 
is inappropriate. The projects that the stadium most directly contributed to were within a 
few blocks (Shafer, 2000), and small restaurant and shop development not unlike what 
surrounds Fifth-Third Field in Toledo. However, the larger amenities that helped to 
maintain momentum in Louisville and led to its large downtown growth in the period 
between 2000 and 2010 likely would have occurred regardless. As Louisville B 
[government] explained when posed the hypothetical of what downtown would look like 
without the stadium: “I believe there would still be some sort of, albeit a very much 
smaller resurgence on East Market and Main. People wouldn't have looked at it in such a 
concentrated manner.” Thus, while Slugger Field played a part in downtown Louisville’s 
revitalization, it does not derserve absolute credit for the changes obsereved. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
My dissertation has studied minor league baseball stadiums evaluating whether 
and how these projects achieve urban redevelopment in the immediately adjacent 
neighborhoods. The motivation for the research was the need for greater examination on 
the numerous redevelopment projects undertaken in small-to-mid sized of American 
cities as well as a more refined and complex work on the subject of stadium-led 
redevelopment. The focus on minor league stadiums has allowed the use of a large panel 
data study of a wide range of cities, which is uncommon in research on sports facilities. 
Specifically, my dissertation has applied the Special Activity Generator framework to 
minor league baseball stadiums, to evaluate their success on a logic underlying the 
public’s financial support for these projects.  
In the previous pages, I have analyzed whether a minor league baseball stadium’s 
effect on redevelopment could be estimated as well as how that effect is realized in two 
cities. In this final chapter, I first summarize all of the findings for both Chapters 3 and 4. 
However, beyond a basic recitation of the results, I pay particular attention to how the 
studies have collectively addressed the tenants of the Special Activity Generator 
framework as well as the ways that the two methodologies interact and inform each other. 
With the central claims of the paper addressed, the chapter concludes with a discussion of 
future directions for the research and lessons for policy. 
5.1 Results 
 Chapter 3 included four sets of analyses, the first of which studied the locations 
of minor league baseball stadiums in order to assess whether they were intended as 
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redevelopment projects by testing a model to predicting their locations. The results 
provide strong evidence that stadiums are placed in impoverished areas and situated 
where they can have a redevelopment impact. Specifically, stadiums are more likely to be 
located in or near census tracts with fewer home owners, fewer children, higher poverty 
rates, more minorities, and larger shares of water as a percentage of the total area. In 
addition, on the measures studied, the tracts near stadiums were not found to be 
redeveloping between 1990 and 2000, indicating that treated areas had not already built 
momentum prior to the stadiums arrival.   
The second half of Chapter 3 evaluated the total effect stadiums have on 
surrounding census tracts after one decade. When analyzing the changes in tracts treated 
by the new stadium against tracts in the same city, stadiums are shown to have a large 
and positive effect on the redevelopment measures tested. That results holds whether the 
entire city is used as the control group, or whether a subset of tracts that are highly 
similar on the traits that influence stadium location is used. In particular, evidence is 
shown that median housing prices, median incomes, and the number of housing units 
increase in the treated areas relative to control tracts in the same cities.  
However, in the final analyses of Chapter 3, I also compare the tracts near the 
stadium to similar tracts in cities that did not build a stadium of any sort during the study 
period; with that control group, the stadium effect is only significant for increases in 
housing construction and vacancy rates. That finding indicates that stadiums may only 
concentrate and redirect redevelopment activities within a city. Just as treated tracts are 
the beneficiaries of receiving a stadium, other parts of these cities face the detriment of 
not receiving the stadium; for that reason, there is both a positive effect near the stadium 
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and a simultaneous negative effect throughout the rest of the city.  
Chapter 4 reported the results of case studies of two cities that built stadiums 
around the year 2000 but observed different effects one decade later: Toledo, Ohio and 
Louisville, Kentucky. Louisville’s downtown has achieved successful growth since the 
opening of Slugger Field. The stadium project was designed to remove a specific space of 
urban blight, which influenced private investors to make additional investments in the 
surrounding area. As respondents argued, the removal of that scrapyard created a more 
hospital area that was more inviting to entertainment and private investments. However, 
much of the secondary developments were not directly related to the stadium, meaning 
that only partial credit for the changes should be given to Slugger Field for the total 
redevelopment of the adjoining neighborhoods.  
In contrast, Toledo’s stadium failed to generate of lasting positive development in 
the surrounding neighborhoods, primarily because of a lack of secondary investments 
generated by the project. While the immediately adjacent blocks have seen growth in 
restaurants, the downtown of the city continues to decline. Despite that, respondents had 
a positive view of the stadium’s ability to generate activity and its effect on the 
perception of the city’s downtown. 
Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1 summarize the cross-case results. Table 5.1displays the 
key codes used in organizing the interview data collected in both cities along with a brief 
analysis of how the code is reflect in both cases, while Figure 5.1 displays the codes with 
a temporal ordering. These variables help to track the factors that explain the differing 
trajectories of Louisville and Toledo’s redevelopment project. 
Louisville’s cohesive political direction across decades and greater preparedness 
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to generate additional amenities played a large part in their successful redevelopment. 
Both cities built attractive, similarly priced stadiums that have had matching effects on 
direct activity generation; however, the difference in additional amenities explains much 
of the difference. While the stadiums created activity, Louisville’s downtown has 
continued to outgrow Toledo with secondary developments, leading to a superior 
redevelopment outcome. Thus, much of the difference in the result was dictated prior to 
shovels hitting the ground for the minor league stadiums.  
Table 5.1 Codes for Qualitative Research 
Code Louisville Toledo 
Political Direction 
Consistent vision and mission, 
3 mayors since 1986 
Political turnover, lack of 
cohesion 
Planning Capacity Comprehensive planning Lack of vision 
Stadium built 
AAA, downtown stadium, 
$49.39 million spent 
AAA, downtown stadium, 
$47.51 million spent 
Increased vitality 
500,000 visitors per year to 
stadium for games 
500,000 visitors per year to 
stadium for games 
Co-Location of 
Amenities 
Numerous amenities located 
near stadium, opened in similar 
time period 
Struggle with more than one 
project per decade 
Secondary 
developments 
 
Growth, from 111 
accommodation and food 
services in 2002 to 147 in 2012 
 
Growth, from 38 
accommodation and food 
services in 2002 to 59 in 2012 
Redevelopment 
Outcome 
Substantial growth Stagnant  
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Figure 5.1 Relationship of Qualitative Codes 
 
 
5.2 Interpretation 
5.2.1 Evaluating the Special Activity Generator Framework 
Both Chapter 3 and 4 provide ample evidence evaluating minor league baseball 
stadiums as Special Activity Generators. Robertson (1995) laid out three objectives that 
SAGs should realize in the surrounding areas in order to be considered successful. First, 
in order to have the maximum public benefits, Special Activity Generators should be 
placed in a blighted area that has been unable to attract private sector investments. The 
location analysis in Chapter 3 indicated that the areas where stadiums are being built 
were among the least developed in their cities. In addition, a closer analysis of the pre-
treatment conditions in both Louisville and Toledo showed that the stadiums were built in 
underdeveloped areas, the tracts for which were often in the lowest tenth percentiles for 
the city on most measures considered. Respondents in both cities mentioned that the areas 
needed an anchor in order to catalyze further investments from the private sector. For 
Toledo, the stadium’s site was selected because the neighborhood was a vast 
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undeveloped space with a decaying industrial purpose and no recognized future use. On 
the other hand, Louisville selected their site in order to eliminate a negative land use at 
the entrance to downtown that had blemished surrounding blocks and prevented private 
investment. In both cases, the stadiums were intended to jumpstart redevelopment efforts 
in areas that were thought to have unlocked unrealized value 
The second anticipated benefit of SAGs is that they create spillover spending for 
surrounding businesses and add vitality during weekends and evenings. In both Toledo 
and Louisville, there was an uptick in restaurants and arts venues in the areas surrounding 
the stadium, indicating a greater liveliness for residents and visitors. Both stadiums have 
also been successful at attracting fans to the games, with each ranking in the middle of 
their league across the entire decade.  In addition, the increase in median income relative 
to the rest of the same cities observed in Chapter 3 indicates that there is additional 
money that is available to be spent at nearby businesses, in so far as such funds are spent 
locally (Speck, 2013). In addition, increases in median housing prices indicate greater 
demand to live in the neighborhood. However, the populations of the treated tracts did 
not grow in either set of analyses in Chapter 3, indicating that activity may not be 
consistent.  
Third, Special Activity Generators are expected to stimulate additional physical 
redevelopment in the surrounding community, be it commercial or residential. Chapter 3 
showed an increase in housing construction, both within the cities and against a 
comparison of cities without stadiums, displaying a strong lure of residential 
development in the areas surrounding stadiums. In addition, the increase in food services 
and accommodations around the stadiums in Toledo and Louisville denotes new 
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construction and the redevelopment of buildings in those areas. 
Thus, there is evidence for all three objectives in both the quantitative analysis 
and the case studies that minor league baseball stadiums in the sample succeeded as 
Special Activity Generators after one decade. However, the magnitude of those changes 
is a related and important question. 
5.2.2 What Share of Credit Should go to Stadiums?  
Beyond the specific objectives of SAGs and the theoretical framework, the case 
studies tested the assumption that minor league stadiums deserve credit for the total effect 
observed in the treatment areas. The assumption that stadiums should account for the 
total effect of the change in census tracts within one mile was critical to Chapter 3’s 
analysis and the ability to estimate the size and direction of change in the treated areas. 
The results from the case studies (Chapter 4) indicate that the results from the 
quantitative analysis (Chapter 3) are overestimating the effect of stadiums. 
In order to attribute the total change in the treated areas to the stadium it is 
necessary that a direct link exists between it and secondary investments; essentially, and 
argument would need to be made that if not for the stadium, the secondary amenities 
would not have been built. In particular, that could occur in the contracting of the deal, 
similar to what was done in San Diego and Petco Field with the guarantee of private 
investments contingent upon the construction of the stadium (Chapin, 2002). However, 
that was not the case in Louisville and none of the respondents argued that all secondary 
developments resulted only from Slugger Field.  
However, Slugger Field did act as an early investment in a particularly difficult 
location, and therefore helped to catalyze further projects and development in the 
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surrounding space. By removing the negative land use of a scrapyard at the entrance to 
downtown, the stadium helped to alter the image of the surrounding area in the public’s 
mind and gave them a reason to visit. The removal of the scrapyard, which previously 
had a deleterious impact on surrounding property values and had prevented private sector 
investment, was identified by respondents as being a critical event that catalyzed further 
redevelopment of downtown. Thus, it is difficult to assign the size of the direct effects to 
the stadium because of the multiplicity of other amenities that were added to the area, but 
it is clear that the full change cannot be credited to the stadium alone. 
Toledo may provide an accurate reflection of the expected returns from an 
isolated stadium development within a declining downtown. Because there were no 
secondary amenities added, Toledo’s stadium deserves the lion share of the credit for the 
changes in the area. However, within the total treated area as measured, there is scarce 
positive change to ascribe to any claimant. The restaurants and nightlife that have opened 
in the surrounding blocks do derive from the stadiums presence, but the complete 
treatment area in Toledo is too large to register a positive change from a single public 
project of this scale. Toledo simply cannot match Louisville on the colocation of 
amenities, whether they had intended to or not. 
The exact share of the change that should be ascribed to Slugger Field or any 
other project is nearly impossible to estimate accurately, and in a way that is primarily an 
academic concern. The concept of ascribing the total change in neighborhoods to the 
stadium alone was an assumption necessary for the models used in Chapter 3; in reality, it 
is unlikely that the city or county funding stadium projects expect that specific scale of 
return. For an official, a successful project is a successful project; while the estimates in 
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Chapter 3 are overly optimistic in the specific magnitudes measured, the effect of 
stadiums are positive on surrounding neighborhoods for a limited geographic space, 
likely an area smaller than what I have measured as treated in this analysis.  
5.2.3 Should Stadiums be Considered Successful? 
If the estimates presented in Chapter 3 are an overestimation of a stadiums effect, 
does that mean a minor league baseball stadiums are a poor investment for governments? 
Accepting that other unrelated developments account for some measure of the change 
observed around the stadiums, there are specific uses for which they have been effective. 
For example, in Louisville Slugger Field was able to remove a negative land use, which 
would have persisted without the stadium deal. In Toledo, the stadium was able to help a 
“blank slate” redevelop into a vibrant restaurant scene, despite having no history as an 
entertainment center. With an appropriate degree of public financing and specific goals, 
stadiums can help governments to achieve their aims.  
While on the whole the analysis does indicate that some redevelopment occurs 
around the stadiums, the final analysis in Chapter 3 indicates that part of the benefits 
derives from the concentration of redevelopment from across the city into one area. For 
city officials concerned about the vitality of their downtowns, that may not be a 
significant worry. Developers and government officials believed downtown to be 
implicitly important for their cities because “you can’t be a suburb to nothing” [Toledo 
G, government] and that “The very fundamental reason for your place existing 
whatsoever is always downtown” [Louisville I, government]. To a degree those views are 
well founded; denser downtowns create increased knowledge spillovers and more 
productive workers, reminding us that the shape of cities does matter (Chatman & 
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Noland, 2014; Glaeser, 2010). It is appropriate for governments to be concerned, and in 
that sense stadiums have delivered on a public benefit underlying their support. However, 
the fact that there is no clear pattern of increased population near the stadium in the cities 
downtowns belies this argument, though it may occur with a longer timeline. 
Beyond estimating the specific scale of the benefits from any stadium, the task of 
evaluating stadium projects must also consider the costs of a public-private 
redevelopment project. While this research has estimated that there are positive 
redevelopment benefits from the project, even if the figures in Chapter 3 are an 
overestimation, in order to determine the worth of these projects would also require the 
enumeration of their costs. The relationship of those two figures, and the opportunity 
costs of the money invested in the stadiums, should never be lost in public debates, 
though the specific costs is beyond the scope of this project. While the public may pay 
attention to either the total cost of the project or the reported amount that the public is 
contributing, the structuring of that deal is also just as important. 
Even though Toledo’s stadium has not had the largest benefits in the sample, the 
structuring of the deal allowed the county to save millions of dollars repaying the bonds 
for the facility. However, that is not often the case. To take an example from major 
league baseball, Arlington’s new stadium includes a surcharge on parking to help finance 
the construction. However, rather than going to repay public contributions, as is typical, 
those funds go to the team, shifting the stadium deal from a 50-50 division of costs closer 
to 70-30 or 80-20 (Shipp and Smith, 2016). Just as the benefits of a stadium will depend 
on the urban context and planning surrounding the project, the actual financing deal can 
greatly shift the costs.  
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5.2.4 Implications for Future Research 
The two case studies provide insight into the importance of considerations prior to 
stadium construction that can impact the success of redevelop projects. Political direction 
and planning capacity are important to consider both from an academic standpoint for 
correctly modeling the potential for change, and for officials to evaluate whether their 
downtown will benefit from significant public expenditures. 
The differences in downtown redevelopment and the ability to attract additional 
investments may relate beyond planning to the differing trajectories for broader economic 
growth that the regions have followed. While both cities had similarly sized populations 
within their cities in 1970 and neither grew significantly until 2000, the Louisville metro 
outgrew the Toledo’s for decade’s. The ability to attract new residents and drive new 
growth throughout the region will likely influence the redevelopment of a city’s 
downtown, regardless of whether they build a stadium or not. 
The broader economic development of the region may also help to explain the 
differences in political stability in both cities. Since 2002, when its stadium was built, 
Toledo has changed mayors five times with the party oscillating between the Democratic 
Party and Independents. The vacillation is indicative of the residents distrust towards 
their own government and skepticism towards each other. While respondents were 
generally positive about the stadium and its effects, an employee of a nonprofit, Toledo Q 
[nonprofit], expressed that the sentiment was not shared by the entire city:  
As a result of the Mud Hens coming down, we still have people that are upset that 
it ever left Maumee and still talk about it. The sports arena, we still have people 
that are upset that the sports arena was stolen from East Toledo and it comes up 
all the time. That's the kind of negativity that is pervasive in Toledo... Those are 
the kinds of things that we need to get over because what we know for sure is the 
arena's not going to come over to the east side. It's in the downtown so now what 
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can we do to support that effort and be positive about it and make great things 
happen. 
  
On the other hand, as explained earlier, since 1986 Louisville has only had three 
mayors.43 However, I do not want to confuse the causation here. It is easier for more 
successful cities to have a cohesive vision as a result of their success and the city’s 
growth may explain why citizens are happier with their government. However, it is 
illustrative that infighting and distrust seem to be the modus operandi for many 
Toledoans, and such political instability may have a significant effect on the city’s future 
prospects for recovery.  Most work on political instability and growth concentrates on the 
international level, though it is worth considering how further numerous levels of 
American politics and competition for businesses and growth interplay with electoral 
returns.  
The case studies also provided additional insights with regard to the definition of 
treatment area as employed in both the quantitative and qualitative analysis. Part of the 
difference in Toledo and Louisville captured in the census data could potentially be 
attributed to what tracts were labeled as treated. Toledo had five tracts that were so 
defined, and one could argue that tracts were included that the stadium was not intended 
to treat; in particular, the North River neighborhood was not discussed in any of the 
planning documents reviewed, and is beyond the scope of where the stadium was 
expected to have a direct and measureable effect. However, to remove those tracts would 
cause selection bias, because it would imply choosing which tracts were treated based on 
the outcome rather than the distance from the stadium. While this is a limitation of the 
 
43 For direct comparison, since 1986 Toledo has had eight mayors. 
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data construction, it also raises the fact that stadiums will not have an effect solely 
because of proximity.  
It would be possible with a smaller number of cases to use planning documents 
and newspaper stories to manually determine what neighborhoods or census tracts were 
treated by a large-scale public project, but it would be critical to do so prior to estimating 
any changes that resulted. In addition, it would be impractical for a sample of 16 
stadiums, and so a clear and consistent rule was adopted across the sample. The definition 
of the treated areas captured a large swatch of cities downtowns; however, in several 
cities there were no census tracts with centroids less than .9 miles away. While a one-
mile radius may have been too large, when using census tracts it was nearly the minimum 
distance possible. More flexible definitions of treated may have been possible if just 
doing case studies, but in order to structure both analyses around a common definition of 
treated the wider radius was necessary. 
A related issue is how that census tracts relate to neighborhoods. While 
Toledoians spoke highly of the stadium’s effect in the Warehouse District, the two census 
tracts used to approximate it and the neighborhood as it is understood by residents may 
be quite different. As One respondent that has lived in the Warehouse District for twenty 
years said "Prior to Fifth Third Field being built, there were seven tenants. There were 
seven people that lived in the warehouse district. Today, there's well over seven 
hundred." [Toledo B, business]. Even if the respondent is using some hyperbolae to 
describe the former state of the neighborhood, he is likely describing a smaller area than I 
have used in the study as the data shows many more than seven residents in 1990 for the 
two tracts that overlay to the Warehouse District. Unfortunately, the Census does not 
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disaggregate census tracts 34 and 37 into Block-Groups, which would allow for a more 
nuanced look at the spatial distribution of redevelopment around the stadium in the 
Warehouse District. 
A finer unit of analysis will improve future studies, whether they concern 
stadiums or other types of SAGs. In particular, the case studies brought to light some of 
the challenges in assessing neighborhood change at the census tract level. With block 
level data, it may have been possible to pinpoint the stadiums effects immediately 
adjacent to the stadium, where it was primarily hoped to have an impact. In future work 
on redevelopment projects with limited reach, census tracts may be too blunt to measure 
accurate effects and there is a great need for block level data to better understand the 
results at the local level as it is understood by residents. However, that limitation was 
accepted for this study because census tract data presented the opportunity to structure 
the analysis over 20 years with consistent geographies. With the increasing availability of 
more minute geographic data coming available from the American Community Survey, 
more nuanced research should be possible in the future 
Louisville also shows clearly the importance of agglomeration in redevelopment, 
both spatially and temporally (Hall, 1989). Because the city had such a concentrated burst 
of activity within less than one square mile, and just as importantly, doing so within a 
single decade allowed each to reinforce the others and maximized the returns. This truth 
was not lost in Toledo, even if it wasn’t achieved. As Toledo S said about prior attempts 
at redevelopment in Toledo, “I think perhaps if the investment in the Riverfront 
[Portside], the convention center, ballpark, and arena had taken place at the same time, it 
would've been a much different story. These actions have all taken place, but taking place 
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overtime is not good enough.” Added to the fact that many of their best assets, 
specifically the zoo, art museum, and University of Toledo are spread out throughout the 
urban core, shows the critical importance of agglomeration to successful revitalization.  
Agglomeration, both spatially and to a lesser extent temporally, are far better 
understood for questions of employment and innovation than they are for the built 
environment. Future research should look at how distances and timing of redevelopment 
projects affect each other, particularly in the context of urban revitalization. 
The case study of Toledo also raises interesting questions about how urban land-
use affects a city’s potential for urban redevelopment. In Chapter 4, I cited that 
approximately 30% of the space in downtown Toledo was devoted to parking and another 
30% of buildings sit vacant. Future research should look at how either of these elements 
or others predicts a city’s likelihood to achieve redevelopment in later decades. While 
Slugger Field was partially celebrated by respondents for alleviating a scrapyard in 
downtown Louisville, it appears that Toledo has far more numerous and smaller negative 
land uses throughout its built environment. Much of the rust belt suffered during 
economic restructuring, though how they have handled vacant properties and the 
development of parking lots likely differs; how cities handle such challenges in the 
present may affect their potential for future growth.  
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APPENDIX A. Minor League Baseball Structure 
 
 
 
The chart above displays all of the levels and leagues of Minor League Baseball 
(MiLB) in the United States. In addition, Independent Leagues are displayed and placed 
roughly alongside their comparable level of competition in MiLB for orientation; 
Independent leagues operate outside of levels, so each league is shown its own entry. 
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Players under contract with a Major League Baseball franchise typically move through 
the levels of minor league baseball linearly; however, the major league team controls the 
player’s contract and can move them freely throughout the organization, making leaps 
possible. In addition, the presence of leagues that offer minimal differences in 
competition make a purely linear path unlikely. Each level of competition house multiple 
leagues, but within any level the leagues are equivalent and help to keep teams 
geographically coordinated to minimize travel.  
Major League Baseball’s draft occurs midseason in June, but rookies are not 
expected to contribute until several seasons later. In their first season they will likely be 
assigned to either a Rookie League, Rookie Advanced, or Short Season A league team; 
Rookie Advanced and Short Season A leagues are slightly more competitive, but all play 
roughly 60 games after the June draft and are a players first taste of professional 
competition. The teams generally play their games in their organizations spring training 
complexes (which are often shared between multiple MLB franchises) and are highly 
geographically concentrated. 
If successful in the first few months, the player may be moved to Class-A the 
same year that he was drafted. If not, the following season the player will likely start at 
either Low-A or High-A depending on their level of talents and maturity. It is common 
for a player to play at both Class-A levels. 
There is only one level of competition for Double-A. Many of the most talented 
prospects move straight to the major leagues after succeeding at Double-A, skipping 
Triple-A. Triple-A baseball is the highest level of minor league competition and the 
players are a mix of prospects with lower ceilings and minor league veterans that provide 
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injury insurance for the major league teams. Triple-A stadiums are the most expensive 
and have the best facilities.  
Players in independent leagues either were undrafted by MLB teams or began 
their careers in MiLB and their teams chose to no longer retain their rights. Independent 
league teams often play at a comparable level of competition to MiLB teams, but players 
are often more experienced but possess less potential. In addition, independent league 
have begun to sign ex-Major League All Stars to increase attention. These players have 
limited attraction to MLB teams due to their advanced age, and so play for independent 
leagues that are primarily focused on attendance and present success rather than player 
development. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 122 
 
APPENDIX B. Control Cities Without Stadiums used in Chapter 3 
City Metro 
Metro 
Population 
Metro 
Median 
Income 
Group 
Ashland, KY Huntington-Ashland, WV-KY-OH 806990 38203 Control 
Ashtabula, OH Ashtabula, OH 201515 43115 Control 
Atlantic, NJ Atlantic City-Hammonton, NJ 354609 56368.5 Control 
Baton Rouge, LA Baton Rouge, LA 1452759 45564 Control 
Bellwood, VA Richmond, VA 1608534 57181 Control 
Benwood, WV Wheeling, WV-OH 379080 38829 Control 
Bon Air, VA Richmond, VA 1608534 57181 Control 
Bowie, AZ Sierra Vista-Douglas, AZ 293956 40903 Control 
Brandon, VT Rutland, VT 94402 47008 Control 
Bremerton, WA Bremerton-Silverdale, WA 483921 62802 Control 
Bridgeport, CT Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT 1013214 93283 Treatment 
Brogden, NC Goldsboro, NC 257206 40913 Control 
Camden, NJ 
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, 
PA-NJ-DE-MD 
7251275 64469 Treatment 
Cayce, SC Columbia, SC 1441082 43140 Control 
Cedar Rapids, IA Cedar Rapids, IA 618939 55122 Treatment 
Centralia, IL Centralia, IL 107371 38404 Control 
Chattanooga, TN Chattanooga, TN-GA 1050302 44337 Treatment 
Columbia, SC Columbia, SC 1441082 43140 Control 
Dayton, OH Dayton, OH 1434088 48638 Treatment 
Duluth, MN Duluth, MN-WI 576818 47929 Control 
East Highland Park, 
VA 
Richmond, VA 1608534 57181 Control 
Ettrick, VA Richmond, VA 1608534 57181 Control 
Fitchburg, MA Worcester, MA-CT 1190854 65728 Control 
Flint, MI Flint, MI 484916 42143 Control 
Fort Lee, VA Richmond, VA 1608534 57181 Control 
Frankfort, IN Frankfort, IN 77792 55025 Control 
Fresno, CA Fresno, CA 1505972 44202 Treatment 
Gainesville, GA Gainesville, GA 357788 51688 Control 
Gardner, MA Worcester, MA-CT 1190854 65728 Control 
Gary, IN Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI 17297913 65066 Treatment 
Hickam Housing, HI Urban Honolulu, HI 1203808 72855.5 Control 
Holyoke, MA Springfield, MA 735289 53844.5 Control 
Hopewell, VA Richmond, VA 1608534 57181 Control 
Kaneohe Station, HI Urban Honolulu, HI 1203808 72855.5 Control 
Killeen, TX Killeen-Temple, TX 677932 47587 Control 
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Laurel, VA Richmond, VA 1608534 57181 Control 
Lexington, KY Lexington-Fayette, KY 636062 51110 Treatment 
Lincoln, NE Lincoln, NE 494504 59481 Treatment 
Lock Haven, PA Lock Haven, PA 93136 43065.5 Control 
Louisville, KY Louisville/Jefferson County, KY-IN 2347683 52149 Treatment 
Madison, WI Madison, WI 1311689 63967 Control 
McMechen, WV Wheeling, WV-OH 379080 38829 Control 
Meadowbrook, VA Richmond, VA 1608534 57181 Control 
Memphis, TN Memphis, TN-MS-AR 1952455 45643 Treatment 
Meriden, CT New Haven-Milford, CT 919869 62846 Control 
Myrtle Beach, SC 
Myrtle Beach-Conway-North Myrtle 
Beach, SC-NC 
757085 44015 Treatment 
New Haven, CT New Haven-Milford, CT 919869 62846 Control 
Oklahoma, OK Oklahoma City, OK 2033384 46278 Treatment 
Oxnard, CA Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA 1197230 77063 Control 
Paducah, KY Paducah, KY-IL 234485 41858 Control 
Peoria, IL Peoria, IL 836891 54274 Treatment 
Petersburg, VA Richmond, VA 1608534 57181 Control 
Philadelphia, PA 
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, 
PA-NJ-DE-MD 
7251275 64469 Treatment 
Port Hueneme, CA Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA 1197230 77063 Control 
Richmond, VA Richmond, VA 1608534 57181 Control 
Sacramento, CA 
Sacramento--Roseville--Arden-
Arcade, CA 
2960380 62352 Treatment 
Schofield Barracks, 
HI 
Urban Honolulu, HI 1203808 72855.5 Control 
Shreveport, LA Shreveport-Bossier City, LA 889349 41220 Control 
Southbridge Town, 
MA 
Worcester, MA-CT 1190854 65728 Control 
Springfield, MA Springfield, MA 735289 53844.5 Control 
St. Andrews, SC Columbia, SC 1441082 43140 Control 
Toledo, OH Toledo, OH 1008848 50463 Treatment 
Urban Honolulu, HI Urban Honolulu, HI 1203808 72855.5 Control 
Valentine, AZ Lake Havasu City-Kingman, AZ 586798 38738 Control 
Waipahu, HI Urban Honolulu, HI 1203808 72855.5 Control 
Waterbury, CT New Haven-Milford, CT 919869 62846 Control 
Waverly town, VA Richmond, VA 1608534 57181 Control 
Webster, MA Worcester, MA-CT 1190854 65728 Control 
West Sacramento, 
CA 
Sacramento--Roseville--Arden-
Arcade, CA 
2960380 62352 Treatment 
Wheeling, WV Wheeling, WV-OH 379080 38829 Control 
Willimantic, CT Worcester, MA-CT 1190854 65728 Control 
Worcester, MA Worcester, MA-CT 1190854 65728 Control 
Yakima, WA Yakima, WA 502701 46632 Control 
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APPENDIX C. Index for Case Selection 
Stadium City Index Level or League 
Louisville Slugger Field Louisville, KY 3.628 Triple-A 
Haymarket Park Lincoln, NE 3.283 American Association 
Chickasaw Bricktown Ballpark Oklahoma City, OK 2.451 Triple-A 
Raley Field Sacramento, CA 2.386 Triple-A 
Dozer Park Peoria, IL 2.339 Low-A 
AutoZone Park Memphis, TN 2.196 Triple-A 
AT&T Field Chatanooga, TN 1.897 Double-A 
The Ballpark at Harbor Yard Bridgeport, CT 1.588 Atlantic League 
Edward A. LeLacheur Park Lowell, MA 1.568 Low-A 
TicketReturn.com Field  Myrtle Beach, SC 1.543 High-A 
U.S. Steel Yard Gary, IN 1.522 American Association 
Campbells Field Camden, NJ 1.407 Atlantic League 
Fifth Third Field Dayton, OH 1.220 Low-A 
Veterans Memorial Stadium Cedar Rapids, IA 1.186 Low-A 
Chukchansi Park Fresno, CA 1.183 Triple-A 
Whitaker Bank Ballpark Lexington, KY 1.077 Low-A 
Fifth Third Field Toledo, OH 1.050 Triple-A 
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APPENDIX D. Interview Questions. 
 
Introductory questions leading to stadium discussion across participants 
How long have you lived in [city] 
What changes have you observed  
What is the biggest change 
What areas in [city] are growing and when did that start 
What do you think drove those changes 
Government/Economic developers  
Why was the site chosen for the stadium 
Were there other sites being considered 
What goals was the government hoping to accomplish 
What other redevelopment efforts were made in the area before the stadium 
How much of the surrounding area is focused on tourists as opposed to residents 
In your opinion, what makes this stadium an asset to the city 
How has the stadium fit into subsequent redevelopment efforts 
Developers 
When did your company begin to pursue redevelopment opportunities in the area 
How have you seen the area change 
How have your projects in the area changed 
What are the forces most strongly changing the city 
How does the stadium (or development) fit into the existing built environment 
In your opinion, what makes this stadium an asset to the city 
How do you view working with [city] government 
Residents 
What has been the biggest change in the area since you arrived 
How has your view of [city’s] downtown changed over time 
How do you view the stadium 
How much of the surrounding area is focused on tourists as opposed to residents 
How does the neighborhood differ on days/months with and without games 
Non Profits 
What has been the biggest change in the area since the stadium 
What role did the stadium play in more recent construction 
How does the stadium (or development) fit into the existing built environment 
What does downtown need moving forward 
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